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EXPANDING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC SCHOOLS (K-12) 






In a tragic case that received international attention, 15-year-old Phoebe Prince 
killed herself after being bullied—both physically and online—by some of her 
classmates.1 Phoebe had moved to Massachusetts from a small town in Ireland, 
enrolling as a freshman at South Hadley High School.2 After a brief relationship with 
a popular boy in the senior class, the taunting by her classmates began. Some 
students called her an “Irish slut” and a “whore,” knocked things out of her hands, 
and sent her threatening texts.3 Some of the students used Facebook and Twitter to 
speak badly about her.4 Phoebe suffered this treatment for three months and then 
hung herself on the stairwell of her home on January 14, 2010.5 Stories like this led 
the Massachusetts legislature to create and implement a comprehensive anti-
bullying law.6 
                                                
* © 2016 Philip Lee. Associate Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law, 
University of the District of Columbia; B.A., Duke University, 1996; J.D., Harvard Law 
School, 2000; Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2012; Ed.D., Harvard 
Graduate School of Education, 2013. I am grateful to Bob O’Neil and Sue Lee for their 
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article, to John Brittain for stimulating 
discussion on First Amendment issues in schools, and to Stephanie Kawamura for her helpful 
research assistance. 
1 See Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 6 Teenagers Are Charged after Classmate’s 
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/us/30bully.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7SAD-TRBX]. See also Donal Lynch, Bullied to 
Death, IRISH INDEPENDENT (Mar. 14, 2010), http://www.independent.ie/lifestyle/bullied-to-
death-26640656.html [https://perma.cc/2UPR-JS9K] (describing what happened to Phoebe 
Prince). 
2 Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 1. 
3 Id. 
4 See Emily Bazelon, What Really Happened to Phoebe Prince? The Untold Story of 
Her Suicide and the Role of the Kids Who Have Been Criminally Charged for It, SLATE (July 




6 See Emily Bazelon, Bullies Beware: Massachusetts Just Passed the Country’s Best 
Anti-Bullying Law, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/bulle 
/2010/04/bullies_beware.html [https://perma.cc/FM5D-7C3P] (“In response to the suicides 
of two of its own kids—Phoebe Prince, 15, from South Hadley and Carl Joseph Walker-
Hoover, 11, from Springfield—lawmakers unanimously passed a bullying prevention law on 
Thursday that is probably the most comprehensive one in the country.”). 
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Phoebe Prince was the victim of bullying and cyberbullying. Bullying refers to 
“a specific type of aggression in which (1) the behavior is intended to harm or 
disturb, (2) the behavior occurs repeatedly over time, and (3) there is an imbalance 
of power, with a more powerful person or group attacking a less powerful one.”7 
The aggression can be verbal (e.g., persistent name-calling), physical (e.g., hitting), 
or psychological (e.g., spreading humiliating rumors).8 In differentiating bullying 
from other forms of harmful behavior, Sameer Hinduja and Justin W. Patchin, 
observe the following distinctions: 
• When someone says or does something unintentionally hurtful and they do 
it once, that’s rude. 
• When someone says or does something intentionally hurtful and they do it 
once, that’s mean. 
• When someone says or does something intentionally hurtful and they keep 
doing it—even when you tell them to stop or show them that you’re 
upset—that’s bullying.9 
Cyberbullying is similar to traditional bullying, but it involves the use of 
electronic devices and social media platforms to commit this intentional and 
repeated aggression—namely verbal and psychological attacks10—against weaker 
                                                
7 Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among U.S. Youth: Prevalence and 
Association with Psychological Adjustment, 285 JAMA 2094, 2094 (2001); see also George 
M. Batsche & Howard M. Knoff, Bullies and Their Victims: Understanding a Pervasive 
Problem in the Schools, 23 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 165, 165 (1994) (“‘Bullying’ is defined as 
a form of aggression in which one or more students physically and/or psychologically (and 
more recently, sexually) harass another student repeatedly over a period of time. Typically, 
the action is unprovoked and the bully is perceived as stronger than the victim.”) (citations 
omitted); Christina Salmivalli, Bullying and the Peer Group: A Review, 15 AGGRESSION & 
VIOLENT BEHAV. 112, 112 (2010) (“Bullying is a subtype of aggressive behavior, in which 
an individual or a group of individuals repeatedly attacks, humiliates, and/or excludes a 
relatively powerless person.”).   
8 See Nansel et al., supra note 7, at 2094. 
9 SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD: 
PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO CYBERBULLYING 8 (2014). The authors further note that 
“just because something doesn’t necessarily qualify as bullying doesn’t mean that it isn’t 
harmful or important to stop.” Id.  
10 Insofar as there exists a distinction between speech and action—in that the First 
Amendment applies to speech, not action—cyberbullying in most cases (e.g., posting 
messages to a social media platform) would be more speech than action. This distinction 
between speech and action was suggested in United States v. O’Brien, a case in which the 
Court upheld the criminal conviction of a protestor for burning his draft card. 391 U.S. 367, 
381–82 (1968) (“For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, 
[O’Brien] was convicted.”). On the other hand, some forms of offline bullying, like assaults, 
theft, or destruction of property would be more action than speech—even if the action meant 
to express an idea. See id. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labelled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct 
intends to thereby to express an idea.”). 
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victims.11 For reasons I give in this Article, cyberbullying has some unique 
characteristics that make it much more dangerous than offline bullying.12 Indeed, 
cyberbullying is so harmful that it should be given diminished First Amendment 
protection as schools seek ways to regulate it. 
In dealing with cases of bullying and cyberbullying, public primary and 
secondary schools—that is, kindergarten through twelfth grade (K–12)13—are 
caught in the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, if they do nothing, they face 
potential liability under federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination based 
on sex,14 “race, color, or national origin,”15 and disability.16 On the other hand, if 
                                                
11 See HINDUJA & PATCHIN, supra note 9, at 11 (defining “cyberbullying” as “willful 
and repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell phones, and other electronic 
devices.”). Note that these scholars omit the power imbalance element from their definition. 
In this Article, I argue that an expanded definition of this element should be included in the 
definition. See infra Part V.A. 
12 See infra Part IV.A. 
13 This Article is about the regulation of cyberbullying at public schools (K-12). It does 
not address cyberbullying at private schools because First Amendment protection is 
generally not available to their students, unless it can show that these private entities were 
acting as state actors. Further, this Article does not address cyberbullying at public colleges 
and universities because, as adults, these students are afforded more First Amendment 
protection. As I will discuss later, children are treated differently for purposes of the First 
Amendment.   
14 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that “[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). School boards may 
face liability under Title IX in cases of student-on-student harassment where: (1) the funding 
recipient has substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known 
sexual harassment occurs; (2) the funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to the 
harassment; (3) of which the recipient has actual knowledge; and (4) that harassment is so 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access 
to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. Davis v. Monroe Cty. 
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 638–52 (1999).  
15 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits a recipient of federal funds from 
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
The “deliberate indifference” standard for Title VI cases is the same as for Title IX cases. 
See Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 665 (2d Cir. 2012).  
16 Both Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012) and Title 
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–34. (2012), prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of disability. Courts have imposed liability under these laws 
based on the “deliberate indifference” standard. See e.g., Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. 
Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345–48 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying deliberate indifference standard in 
determining liability under Section 504); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 
(8th Cir. 2011) (applying deliberate indifference to Title II and Section 504 claims); Duvall 
v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To recover monetary damages under 
Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional 
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schools overreact, they face potential liability for violating their students’ free 
speech rights.17 In this Article, I argue that schools should have the authority to 
regulate cyberbullying, even if it originates off campus and during nonschool hours. 
I contend that this is not an overreaction; indeed, it is a necessary tool to fight the 
unique and serious dangers of cyberbullying.18   
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the relevant framework for 
regulating student speech in public school settings. Part II explores our current age 
of digital expression and its implications for school authority to regulate 
cyberbullying—a type of bullying that typically originates off campus using 
personal computers and smart phones. Part III describes the five approaches that 
courts and legislatures have taken to analyze student speech rights in the digital age 
when students use electronic devices off campus to attack or threaten others 
associated with campus. Part IV analyzes why schools should be able to regulate 
off-campus speech in cases of cyberbullying, focusing on the particular harm that 
cyberbullying causes, the inadequacy of other legal remedies to address this harm, 
and the reasons why schools are uniquely situated to address this form of student-
on-student aggression. Finally, Part V offers three suggestions on how schools 
should regulate cyberbullying without running afoul of the First Amendment, 
including a clear definition of the term that is consistent with the social science 
literature, a clear statement of school jurisdiction to regulate cyberbullying when it 
originates off campus, and a proposal for how the Tinker test19 should be thought 
about and applied in cases of cyberbullying.   
 
I.  STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT PUBLIC SCHOOLS (K–12) 
 
Cyberbullying involves a student using electronic devices to post or send 
content intentionally and repeatedly in order to harm a weaker student.20 However, 
when a student posts expressive content to social media or sends messages 
electronically, that student’s speech rights are implicated. In cases where students 
have challenged their school-imposed punishments for attacking others online, they 
consistently use First Amendment law as the primary basis for their lawsuits.21 In 
this section, I outline the legal framework for student free speech rights at public 
schools (K–12).  
                                                
discrimination on the part of the defendant . . . . We now determine that the deliberate 
indifference standard applies.”) (citations omitted). 
17 See infra Part III.B–E for analysis of cases in which students bring First Amendment 
claims in court after schools discipline them for their speech.   
18 See infra Part IV.A. 
19 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding 
that schools cannot regulate the content of student speech unless the speech “would 
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge on the rights of other 
students.”). 
20 See infra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.  
21 See infra Part III.B–E. 
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A.  Tinker v. Des Moines 
 
The landmark case on student free speech rights at public schools, Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District, was decided by the Supreme 
Court in 1969.22 Tinker involved junior and senior high school students in Iowa who 
wore black armbands to school in a peaceful political protest of the conflict in 
Vietnam.23 These students were suspended in violation of a school policy that 
prohibited students from wearing these armbands.24 The Court noted, “First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”25 The Court recognized that the symbolic act 
of wearing black armbands to school was protected as a form of “pure speech,” 
which “is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”26   
As such, the Tinker Court held that “to justify prohibition of a particular 
expression of opinion,” school officials must prove that the expression “would 
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students.”27 This first test has come to be known as the “substantial disruption test.”28 
Later in the opinion, the Court noted that this test could be satisfied with “facts which 
might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities.”29 In other words, school officials do not 
have to wait until substantial disruption or material interference actually occurs 
before acting; they just need a reasonable belief that it may occur.30 However, the 
                                                
22 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505 n.1. (relying on two Fifth Circuit cases that involved high 
school students in Mississippi who wore buttons to school protesting the denial of voting 
rights to African Americans); see Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1966); 
Blackwell v. Issaquena Cty Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1966). See Kristi L. 
Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Substantial Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
1129, 1141 (2009), for a fascinating analysis of these two cases. 
23 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
24 Id. at 504. 
25 Id. at 506. Tinker’s view of a “schoolhouse gate,” presupposes a physically bound 
school and does not contemplate online spaces of communication that are linked to schools 
in various ways. In this Article, I aim to expand what “schoolhouse gate” means in our digital 
age and recommend school authority to regulate such spaces within certain limits. See infra 
Parts IV.B and IV.C.   
26 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–06. 
27 Id. at 509. 
28 The Tinker Court articulated this test in a number of ways, including conduct that 
would (1) “substantially interfere with the work of the school,” id. at 509; or (2) cause 
“material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline,” id. at 511; or (3) 
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school,” id. at 513. 
29 Id. at 514.   
30 Subsequent cases have demonstrated that applying Tinker’s “reasonable forecast of 
substantial disruption” is a highly context-specific inquiry.  See e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. 
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Court warned that school officials must demonstrate something “more than a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.”31 The second Tinker test regarding interference with the 
rights of others has not been heavily relied on by courts.32 
In describing the scope of free speech rights in schools, the Tinker Court did not 
restrict it to the classroom, but also included other areas on school grounds by 
observing:  
 
A student’s rights . . . do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When 
he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the 
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial 
subjects . . . if he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.33   
 
Applying these principles, the Court found that school officials failed to justify its 
prohibition on armbands with a showing of either substantial interference with 
school activities or impingement on the rights of other students.34 Thus, the students’ 
                                                
Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In applying Tinker, we look to the totality of the 
relevant facts. We look not only to James’ actions, but to all of the circumstances confronting 
the school officials that might reasonably portend disruption.”) (citation omitted); J.S. v. 
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 569 Pa. 638, 673 (Pa. 2002) (“Keeping in mind the unique nature 
of the school setting and the student’s diminished rights therein, while there must be more 
than some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech, complete chaos is not required 
for a school district to punish student speech.”) (citations omitted). 
31 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.  
32 See Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The 
precise scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of others’ language is unclear.”). But 
see Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated 127 
S. Ct. 1484, 1484 (2007) (holding that school’s prohibition of a student from wearing a T-
shirt that stated “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” was constitutional because the 
message contained on the shirt interfered with “the rights of other students.”) The Supreme 
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for dismissal of the 
appeal of the preliminary injunction as moot because the district court had entered final 
judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit subsequently 
dismissed the appeal. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(applying Tinker’s “interference with the rights of others” test); Harper v. Poway Unified 
Sch. Dist., 485 F.3d 1052, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 
33 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
34 Id. at 508 (“The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, 
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of 
petitioners. There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, 
with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be 
let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the 
work of the schools or the rights of other students.”). Note the school officials, in their brief, 
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free speech rights in wearing their armbands to school were protected by the First 
Amendment.35   
 
B.  Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse 
 
Other cases further defined the contours of free speech rights at public schools. 
Three subsequent Supreme Court cases, in particular, have created exceptions to the 
application of Tinker in student free speech cases.36   
First, in Bethel School District v. Fraser,37 a public high school student in the 
state of Washington was suspended for giving a speech in a school assembly 
attended by 600 students.38 The speech was replete with “an elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor.”39 The student was suspended and removed from the list 
of graduation speakers at the school’s commencement exercises.40 The student, by 
                                                
unsuccessfully argued for a reasonableness standard to be applied in their actions: 
 
The law . . . gives school authorities the right to adopt reasonable rules and 
regulations governing the conduct of the pupils. If the regulation is reasonable in 
the light of existing facts and circumstances the Court may not question the 
discretion vested in the school authorities. It is not for the courts to consider 
whether the rule in retrospect was wise or expedient so long as it was a reasonable 
exercise of the discretion vested in the school authorities. 
 
Brief for Respondents at 30, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
509 (1969) (No. 21), 1968 WL 94384, at *30 (citations omitted).  
35 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (“[The students] neither interrupted school activities nor 
sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others. They caused discussion outside 
of the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder. In the circumstances, our 
Constitution does not permit officials of the State to deny their form of expression.”). 
36 Lower courts have also created exceptions to Tinker. See, e.g., Guzick v. Drebus, 431 
F.2d 594, 597–98 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding a content-neutral prohibition of students from 
wearing any buttons at school in a context of racial conflict, as distinguishable from Tinker).   
37 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
38 Id. at 678. 
39 Id. The content of the speech was provided in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion: 
 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his 
character is firm—but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is 
firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, 
he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he 
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who 
will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote 
for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our 
high school can be.  
 
Id. at 687. (Brennan, J., concurring). 
40 Id. at 678. 
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his father, challenged his discipline on free speech grounds.41 The Fraser Court 
upheld the school officials’ actions against the student and held it was not a violation 
of the First Amendment. The Court observed that part of the educational mission of 
public school was “educating our youth for citizenship” and teaching “the 
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and 
deportment in and out of class.”42 It also recognized the in loco parentis43 role of 
schools “to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from exposure to 
‘sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.’”44 As such, the Court held, “The First 
Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a 
vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic 
educational mission.”45 It noted that “it was perfectly appropriate for the school to 
disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd 
conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school 
education.”46 With a nod to Tinker’s concern about infringing on the rights of others, 
the Fraser Court also acknowledged the harm the student’s speech would have on 
both teachers and students.47 It noted: 
 
The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly offensive to 
both teachers and students—indeed to any mature person. By glorifying 
male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting 
to teenage girl students. The speech could well be seriously damaging to 
its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the 
threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some students were reported 
as bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked.48 
 
For these reasons, the school had the legal authority to prohibit “sexually explicit, 
indecent, or lewd speech” at school events.49 
                                                
41 Id. at 679. 
42 Id. at 683. 
43 In loco parentis means “in the place of a parent” and describes the early legal 
relationship between schools and their students. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *441 (observing that a parent “may delegate part of his parental authority, 
during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and had 
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and 
correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed”). 
44 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. 
45 Id. at 685. 
46 Id. at 685–86. 
47 Id. at 683–84. 
48 Id. (citation omitted). 
49 Id. at 684. Even though Fraser arose at an on-campus event, based on the educational 
mission rationale, the Court’s holding should apply to all school events, meaning both events 
on school property and off-campus events sanctioned by the school. The educational mission 
of public schools would be relevant to both of these contexts.   
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Second, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,50 Missouri high school 
students challenged the principal’s removal of two articles regarding the impact of 
divorce on students and the experiences of students with pregnancy from a school-
sponsored newspaper.51 The principal claimed that he removed the articles because 
he was concerned about the privacy of some of the people interviewed for the stories 
and thought that the sexual content was inappropriate for some of the younger 
students in the school.52 The Court, in ruling for the school officials, held that 
“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over 
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so 
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”53 
Thus, the Court acknowledged that educators are able to prohibit school-sponsored 
speech to a greater extent than nonschool sponsored speech.54 
Third, in Morse v. Frederick,55 a number of high school students in Alaska, 
while watching torchbearers run past their school on their way to the Olympic winter 
games, displayed a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”56 
The students, who were part of this school-sponsored event, were holding the banner 
across the street from the school and could be seen by students on the school side of 
the street.57 The principal believed that the banner encouraged illegal drug use, so 
she demanded the banner be taken down.58 The only student who refused to comply 
with the principal’s demand was subsequently suspended.59 This student challenged 
his suspension as a violation of his free speech rights.60 The Supreme Court held that 
“a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a 
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use.”61 Although this student was engaged in off-campus expression, it did not 
                                                
50 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
51 Id. at 263–64. 
52 Id. at 263. 
53 Id. at 273. 
54 Id. at 271 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form 
of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is 
designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be 
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school. Hence, a school may in its capacity as publisher of a 
school newspaper or producer of a school play ‘disassociate itself,’ Fraser, 478 U.S., at 685, 
106 S.Ct., at 3165, not only from speech that would ‘substantially interfere with [its] 
work . . . or impinge upon the rights of other students,’ Tinker, 393 U.S., at 509, 89 S.Ct., at 
738, but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately 
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.”).  
55 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
56 Id. at 397. 
57 Id. at 398. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 399. 
61 Id. at 403. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s holding, 
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matter for the Court’s analysis.62 The Court emphasized that all school-sponsored 
and school-supervised activities off campus grounds—such as field trips—were 
subject to the school’s rules of conduct.63 In refusing to protect the student’s 
expression, the Morse Court noted that the dangers of drug use are “serious and 
palpable” and students needed to be protected from such harm.64  
In sum, these three cases have carved out exceptions to Tinker. Based on these 
exceptions, schools can prohibit student speech in certain situations even if they 
cannot demonstrate substantial disruption or interference with the rights of others. 
Fraser allows school officials to restrict “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and 
conduct” at school events.65 Hazelwood permits school officials to prohibit school-
sponsored speech on the basis of legitimate pedagogical concerns.66 Finally, Morse 
allows school officials to regulate speech at school-sanctioned activities that is 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.67  
It is important to note that all four of these landmark cases—Tinker and its three 
exceptions—arose on school grounds or at school-sanctioned events. Specifically, 
Tinker occurred at high school and junior high campuses, and the Court grounded 
its holding in “the special characteristics of the school environment”68 recognizing 
that constitutional protections extend within “the schoolhouse gate.”69 Fraser took 
place in a high school auditorium, and rested its decision on the understanding that 
children had less First Amendment rights at public school than adults do in other 
settings.70 Hazelwood was at a high school where students were working on a school-
sanctioned newspaper.71 The Hazelwood Court described Tinker as “address[ing] 
educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on 
the school premises.”72 Finally, Morse took place across the street from a high school 
during a school-sanctioned event.73 By allowing the school to regulate the 
                                                
but with his understanding that “it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on 
issues such as ‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal 
use.’” Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Alito 
cautioned against a broad reading of the majority’s opinion that “endorse[s] the broad 
argument advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First Amendment permits 
public school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s 
‘educational mission.’” Id. at 423. 
62 Id. at 400–01. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 408. 
65 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675–83 (1986). 
66 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
67 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403. 
68 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
69 Id.  
70 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
71 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. 
72 Id. at 271. 
73 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397. 
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expression, the Morse Court emphasized that the field trip “occurred during normal 
school hours,” “was sanctioned by [the principal] ‘as an approved social event or 
class trip,’” “[t]eachers and administrators were interspersed among the students and 
charged with supervising them,” and the “high school band and cheerleaders 
performed.”74  
 
C.  Off-Campus Speech and General First Amendment Law 
 
Under general First Amendment principles, and most relevant to this Article, 
the Court has decided that certain categories of speech receive either diminished or 
no First Amendment protections: (1) “fighting words;”75 (2) certain types of 
defamation;76 (3) incitement to imminent lawless action;77 (4) “true threats;”78 and 
(5) obscenity.79 If private student speech—i.e., neither sanctioned nor supervised by 
the school—occurs off campus, then courts typically apply these categories in 
deciding whether or not speech is protected by the First Amendment.80 For example, 
in Thomas v. Board of Education,81 a public high school suspended students for 
publishing an underground newspaper that the school officials thought distasteful.82 
Although the students had written “an occasional article” in the school after classes, 
the rest of the publication process, including printing and distribution, had occurred 
after school hours and off campus.83 The Second Circuit held that Tinker did not 
control because the newspaper was off-campus speech.84 The court applied general 
First Amendment law and held the students’ suspensions unconstitutional because 
the speech did not fall into any exception to First Amendment protection.85 Also, in 
Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board,86 a high school student drew a picture of 
                                                
74 Id. at 400–01.   
75 Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
76 See NY Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
77 See Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
78 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (analyzing true threats). 
79 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
80 See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(refusing to apply Tinker and analyzing facts under general First Amendment principles); 
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050–53 (2d Cir. 1979) (same). 
81 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
82 Id. at 1045. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 1050 (“The case before us . . . arises in a factual context distinct from that 
envisioned in Tinker and its progeny. While prior cases involved expression within the 
school itself, all but an insignificant amount of relevant activity in this case was deliberately 
designed to take place beyond the schoolhouse gate.”).   
85 Id. at 1050–53. But see Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 
821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Tinker does apply to a student-published underground 
newspaper distributed on school grounds).   
86 Porter, 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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his school being attacked by missiles, helicopters, and armed assailants.87 The 
student placed the drawing in his closet and the school learned of it when the 
student’s younger brother inadvertently brought it to school.88 Applying general 
First Amendment principles instead of Tinker, the Fifth Circuit determined that the 
picture did not fall into the free speech exception of “true threat,”89 and therefore 
was protected expression.90   
However, unlike the physical drawings at issue in Thomas and Porter, many 
free speech cases arise in an electronic and digital context, and it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for courts to draw clear lines between on-campus expression, 
where Tinker applies, and off-campus expression, where general First Amendment 
law applies.91 In the next Part, I analyze how social media is changing the student 
speech landscape and how courts have struggled to keep up.  
 
II.  SCHOOLS IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL EXPRESSION 
 
A.  Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate 
 
Over the last fifty years since Tinker was decided, technology has altered the 
landscape of communications in such a way that the Supreme Court’s concept of “at 
the schoolhouse gate”92 is becoming difficult to demarcate with physical boundaries. 
Tinker presupposed that students’ rights continued as they entered into the physical 
space of a school. It, thus, placed First Amendment limits on school speech 
regulation in this context. However, the Court did not contemplate the ways in which  
 
                                                
87 Id. at 611. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 616 (“Speech is a ‘true threat’ and therefore unprotected if an objectively 
reasonable person would interpret the speech as a ‘serious expression of an intent to cause a 
present or future harm.’ The protected status of the threatening speech is not determined by 
whether the speaker had the subjective intent to carry out the threat; rather, to lose the 
protection of the First Amendment and be lawfully punished, the threat must be intentionally 
or knowingly communicated to either the object of the threat or a third person.”) (emphasis 
in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 
616 (8th Cir. 2002)).  
90 Id. at 617–18. 
91 Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish Off-
Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 265–66 (2008) (“[I]n most 
jurisdictions, even if the ‘intended audience was undoubtedly connected to [the school],’ 
courts will refuse to address incidents of cyberbullying. Even in the few jurisdictions 
applying the ‘sufficient nexus’ test, school districts will struggle to establish the nexus in the 
numerous circumstances where the web site content negatively impacts the life of a student 
on campus but where it is not accessed at school or carried onto campus.”) (alterations in the 
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 
1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000)). 
92 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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technology would permit schools to transcend the boundaries of any geographic 
location.    
Indeed, the way both schools and their students are utilizing this technology is 
expanding what the “schoolhouse gate” means. For example, many public schools 
are employing virtual classrooms in which classes are being taught online.93 These 
virtual classrooms are not bounded by physical walls. For example, in some Florida 
schools, “e-learning labs” allow “[s]tudents [to] log on to a Web site to gain access 
to lessons, which consist mostly of text with some graphics, and they can call, e-
mail or text online instructors for help.”94 If these classrooms exist in cyberspace 
and the teachers are located off site, but can be reached by electronic devices, it 
makes little sense to think about the “schoolhouse gate” as bounded by the 
geographic boundaries of the school. School extends far beyond these boundaries.     
Moreover, when students use social media, such as Facebook, Instagram, and 
Twitter, to communicate outside of school, their ideas may be viewed by anyone 
both inside and outside the schoolhouse gate. In Reno v. ACLU,95 Justice John Paul 
Stevens presaged the implications of these new technologies, observing almost 
twenty years ago, that “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone 
line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from 
any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the 
same individual can become a pamphleteer.”96 
Social media creates this expansive communicative reach for three main 
reasons. First, the Internet is widely available and constantly accessed by young 
people. Sherry Turkle, in writing about how people engage with technology, 
observes: 
 
Teenagers tell me they sleep with their cell phone . . . . The technology has 
become like a phantom limb, it is so much a part of them. These young 
people are among the first to grow up with an expectation of continuous 
connection: always on, and always on them.97   
                                                
93 Trip Gabriel, More Pupils Are Learning Online, Fueling Debate on Quality, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/education/06online.html 
[[https://perma.cc/F92Q-BAB5]; see also Anya Kamenetz, Study in Your PJs? What a High 
School ‘Work from Home Day’ Looks Like, NPR (Feb. 23, 2016, 6:37 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/02/23/466460375/study-in-your-pjs-what-a-high-
school-work-from-home-day-looks-like [https://perma.cc/4ACH-TJ24] (“Nationwide, about 
400,000 K-12 students are taking or have taken at least one fully online course, and far more 
schools are using platforms like Schoology to provide online assignments outside of 
traditional school hours.”). 
94 Laura Herrera, In Florida, Virtual Classrooms With No Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 
17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/education/18classrooms.html 
[https://perma.cc/XTR2-RR7T].  
95 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
96 Id. at 870. 
97 SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY 
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According to a recent study from the Pew Research Center that was published in 
April 2015, 92% of teenagers—defined in the report as those people between 13 to 
17—report going online daily and 24% report going online “almost constantly.”98 
According to the study, this “frenzy of access” is facilitated by the widespread use 
of smartphones.99 The Pew study finds that 73% of teens have access to 
smartphones, which enable access to various social media platforms.100 Facebook is 
currently the most popular platform, used by 71% of teenagers, followed by 
Instagram (used by 52%), Snapchat (used by 41%), and Twitter (used by 33%).101   
Second, social media, with the click of a button, allows a user to quickly send 
messages to a large number of people.102 This access is not open for all to see, unless 
the user decides that is what she or he wants. The social media audience is typically 
defined by the user through invitation-only entry points, such as “friend” requests, 
and a number of user-controlled privacy settings.103 Nonetheless, many social media 
platforms can greatly enhance a student’s ability to publicize her views to many 
people. For example, Facebook enables its users to post messages, pictures, and 
videos onto sections of their online profiles called “timelines,” which generally can 
be viewed by the user’s Facebook “friends.”104 Facebook further permits users to 
interact with each other by sharing information on their timelines.105 This application 
also lets users send personal messages to each other,106 tag each other so that users 
                                                
AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER 16–17 (2011). 
98 Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-
2015/ [https://perma.cc/4BPZ-HHXH]. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. At the time of this study, these social media platforms were reported to be the 
most popular. Id. However, with the continual invention of new platforms, the most 
frequently used ones are constantly changing. For the purposes of this Article, I have focused 
on the most popular forms of social media reported both in the Pew Study and in court cases 
centering on school discipline for social media usage.   
102 Paris S. Strom & Robert D. Strom, When Teens Turn Cyberbullies, EDUCATION 
DIGEST, Dec. 1, 2005, at 35, 36 (“Instead of remaining a private matter or event known by 
only a small group, text or photographs can be communicated to a large audience in a short 
time.”). 
103 For example, Facebook users can currently adjust their privacy settings to restrict 
who can see their posts, who can contact them, and who can search for them. See Basic 
Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
325807937506242/ https://perma.cc/AJ7P-MVRY. Facebook also allows user to block 
specific users from viewing their content. Id. 
104 See How Do I Post to My Timeline?, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1462219934017791 [https://perma.cc/8K8S-9WDN].  
105 Id. 
106 See Who Can I Send Messages To?, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/438779846195810 [https://perma.cc/WXD8-UFW3]. 
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are notified when something is posted about them,107 and start online chats with 
single or multiple users.108 Another application, Snapchat, allows its users to take a 
photo or video, add a caption, and send it to other users.109 This “Snap” disappears 
from the screen unless the recipient takes a screenshot of it.110 Finally, Twitter allows 
its users to send and read short 140-character messages, called “tweets.”111 Twitter 
users register for accounts and can follow other users’ accounts.112 The tweets from 
the followed accounts populate the followers’ Twitter home pages in a live message 
feed.113 Twitter also enables users to “retweet” other users’ tweets.114 Based on these 
capabilities, Twitter messages can quickly reach large numbers of people.  
Third, social media facilitates mass participation in collective dialogues in 
virtual communities of interest. As mentioned, Facebook allows users to “friend” 
each other, and the posts of Facebook friends will appear on their respective news 
feeds,115 thereby creating an online community of people updating each other with 
all types of information. Moreover, Instagram allows its users to:  
  
                                                
107 See Tagging, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/2326 
20513462357 [https://perma.cc/UK7V-85K4]. 
108 See How Do I Start Chatting with a Friend?, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP CENTER, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/193822797331287 [https://perma.cc/9QJT-U6GY]. 
109 See Create and Send Snaps, Subtopic in Snapchat Support, SNAPCHAT, 
https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/article/create (on file with Utah Law Review). 
110 Id.  
111 See Using Twitter: The Basics: Posting a Tweet, TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER, 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/15367-posting-a-tweet# [https://perma.cc/F9C4-VDH6]. 
In addition to text, tweets can contain photos and videos as well. See id. 
112 An account on Twitter is designated: “@[username].” See Using Twitter: The 
Basics: Signing Up, TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/1009 
90# [https://perma.cc/95L6-Y9YH]. Note that users can currently block other users from 
following them if they so choose. See Using Twitter: The Basics: Customizing Your 
Experience, TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063-
blocking-users-on-twitter# [https://perma.cc/MG2D-4QXN]. 
113 See Using Twitter: The Basics: Tweeting: Posting a Tweet, TWITTER.COM: HELP 
CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/15367# [https://perma.cc/2LBN-4PJP]. 
114 Using Twitter: The Basics: Tweeting: Retweeting Another Tweet, TWITTER.COM: 
HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169873# [https://perma.cc/W453-
ABZ9]. 
115 How Does News Feed Decide Which Stories to Show?, FACEBOOK.COM: HELP 
CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/166738576721085 [https://perma.cc/GX99-
MN4R] (“The stories that show in your News Feed are influenced by your connections and 
activity on Facebook. This helps you to see more stories that interest you from friends you 
interact with the most. The number of comments and likes a post receives and what kind of 
story it is (ex: photo, video, status update) can also make it more likely to appear in your 
News Feed.”). 
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Take a picture or video, then customize it with filters and creative tools. 
Post it on Instagram and share instantly on Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr and 
more—or send it directly as a private message. Find people to follow based 
on things you’re into, and be part of an inspirational community.116 
 
Additionally, Twitter is known for its hashtags that can bring attention to various 
issues and engage people in online communication around common themes.117 A 
hashtag is a word or phrase preceded by the hash or pound sign (#) that social media 
users can use to identify messages on specific topics.118 Hashtags were created 
organically by Twitter users as a means to search for tweets based on message 
content.119 When social media users tweet and retweet messages with the same 
hashtags, these hashtags start to trend, and the issues that these messages are 
connected to become more visible to the public.120  
For these reasons, social media is an incredibly powerful tool for student 
expression. Also for these reasons, when social media is being used by students, the 
distinction between on-campus and off-campus speech is not easily made. As one 
judge has noted, digital communication appears to be “everywhere at once.”121 This 
is particularly problematic when students abuse social media to bully their fellow 
students.   
 
B.  Bullying in the Digital Age 
 
The increasing societal awareness of bullying and cyberbullying—particularly 
after a number of highly publicized suicides of young students across the 
                                                
116 Instagram App of the Day, CITRUSBITS: BLOG (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://citrusbits.com/instagram-app-of-the-day/ [https://perma.cc/5GPX-84HP].  
117 See Using Twitter: The Basics: Tweeting: Using Hashtags on Twitter, 
TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/49309-using-hashtags-on-
twitter# [https://perma.cc/9794-FQPY]. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 Using Twitter: Beyond the Basics: More about Twitter: FAQS about Trends on 
Twitter, TWITTER.COM: HELP CENTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/53-
discover/topics/216-trends/articles/101125-faqs-about-trends-on-twitter# [https://perma.cc 
/6WSF-FA82] (“Trends are determined by an algorithm and, by default, are tailored for you 
based on who you follow and your location. This algorithm identifies topics that are popular 
now, rather than topics that have been popular for a while or on a daily basis, to help you 
discover the hottest emerging topics of discussion on Twitter that matter most to you.”). 
121 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Smith, J., concurring). 
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country122—has spurred state lawmakers to act.123 Indeed, as of January 2016, all 
fifty states, along with the District of Columbia, have enacted anti-bullying laws.124 
The requirements of anti-bullying laws differ by state.125 Common elements of these 
laws require or encourage schools to develop an anti-bullying policy, implement 
anti-bullying training programs, and report bullying to authorities and institute 
appropriate disciplinary action when it occurs.126 Most statutes incorporate Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” and “interference with the rights of others” tests along with 
                                                
122 See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by 
Cyberbullies, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicide-
of-girl-after-bullying-raises-worries-on-web-sites.html [https://perma.cc/PM4U-7AEB] 
(discussing 12-year-old Rebecca Ann Sedwick’s suicide after being cyberbullied); John 
Halligan, Death by Cyber-Bully, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.boston.com/news 
/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/08/17/death_by_cyber_bully/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YJL7-G524] (Ryan Halligan’s father discussing his 13-year-old son’s suicide after enduring 
online bullying and lauding Massachusetts for adopting a pilot program to prevent all forms 
of student harassment in the commonwealth’s schools); Helen Kennedy, Phoebe Prince, 
South Hadley High School’s ‘New Girl,’ Driven to Suicide by Teenage Cyberbullies, DAILY 
NEWS (March 29, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/phoebe-prince-south-
hadley-high-school-new-girl-driven-suicide-teenage-cyber-bullies-article-1.165911 [https:// 
perma.cc/PJ7M-J2S9] (discussing 15-year-old Phoebe Prince’s suicide after she was 
cyberbullied); Felicia R. Lee, The Rough-and-Tumble Online Universe Traversed by Young 
Cybernauts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/arts/tele 
vision/22front.html [https://perma.cc/Q9P4-AVCA] (discussing Ryan Halligan’s suicide 
after enduring online bullying); Yvonne Wenger, Teen’s Suicide Raises Long-Standing 
Concerns about Cyber-Bullying (April 17, 2012), BALTIMORE SUN, http://articles.baltimore 
sun.com/2012-04-17/news/bs-md-ho-cyber-suicide-20120417_1_cyber-bullying-deb-
poquette-cyberbullying-research-center [https://perma.cc/687Y-43QA] (discussing 15-year-
old Grace McComas’s suicide after being cyberbullied); Yalanda Young, Online Teasing 
Leads to Teen’s Suicide (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.kait8.com/story/11566204/online-
teasing-leads-to-teens-suicide [https://perma.cc/3AD2-CMQG] (discussing 12-year-old 
Sarah Lynn Butler’s suicide after being bullied on MySpace). 
123 See Kevin P. Brady, Criminal State Anti-Bullying Statutes: Does Legislative Zeal 
Outweigh Constitutional Considerations, 298 EDUC. L. REP. 21, 28–35 (2013), for a multi-
state overview of how high profile teen suicides created the impetus for new anti-bullying 
legislation. As of the writing of this article, federal anti-bullying laws have been proposed 
but not enacted. See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. 
(2009), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr1966/text [https://perma.cc/MD64-
SND9]; Safe School Improvement Act of 2010, S. 3739, 111th Cong. (2010), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s3739/text/is [https://perma.cc/R97C-5RWG].  
124 See SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, STATE CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH 
CENTER, STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS: A BRIEF REVIEW OF STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS 
AND POLICIES 1 (2016), http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-
Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBA3-6KY5] [hereinafter STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS]. 
125 I have not attempted a survey of every state’s law, but will use examples from certain 
states to highlight different approaches. See infra Part III.A–D.   
126 STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 2–20.  
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the “hostile educational environment” standard arising from federal 
antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VI and IX.127 Fourteen states extend school 
authority to regulate speech that originates off campus.128   
Forty-eight states have enacted laws that restrict harassment using electronic 
media, and twenty-three states have passed laws that specifically prohibit 
cyberbullying.129 While some anti-bullying statutes criminalize bullying,130 most of 
these laws put the onus on schools to develop policies to address the problem.131   
Courts have also differed in their analysis of First Amendment principles in 
cases of bullying, cyberbullying, and other peer-on-peer attacking. I will highlight 
some of the different approaches in the Part III. 
 
III.  FIVE APPROACHES TO SCHOOL REGULATION OF HARMFUL OFF-CAMPUS 
SPEECH 
 
In determining whether or not schools can regulate off-campus speech under 
Tinker, courts and legislatures have adopted five analytic approaches: (1) finding no 
authority to regulate off-campus speech;132 (2) making no distinction between on-
campus and off-campus speech;133 (3) requiring a sufficient nexus between the off-
campus speech and the campus;134 (4) mandating that the off-campus speech 
reaching campus be reasonably foreseeable by its creator;135 and (5) limiting school 
authority to regulate off-campus speech to situations where there is an identifiable 
threat of school violence.136   
  
                                                
127 STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 2–20. 




132 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (2015); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 59-63-140 (2014). 
133 See e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2015); FL. STAT. § 1006.147 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
16 §11 (2015). 
134 See e.g., Killion v. Franklin Regional Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. 
Pa. 2001); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178––1179 (E.D. 
Mo. 1998); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 569 Pa. 638, 667 (Pa. 2002); See also NJ STAT. 
ANN. § 18A:37-15.3 (West 2015).   
135 See e.g., S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012); 
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. #60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. Of Weedsport Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008). See also N.Y. 
EDUC. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2015). 
136 See e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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A.  The No Authority Approach 
 
The first approach, which I call the “no authority approach,” views a school’s 
regulatory authority under Tinker as limited to on-campus or school-sanctioned 
speech. Under this approach, a school has no authority to prohibit off-campus speech 
that occurs at nonschool-sanctioned activities, apart from using general First 
Amendment principals (e.g., regulating fighting words, obscenity, true threats, 
incitement, etc.).   
Although scholars have argued for this approach,137 most courts have refused 
to apply it in their Tinker analysis.138 Many state legislatures, however, have adopted 
this approach in their anti-bullying laws.139 For example, Alabama defines 
“harassment” for purposes of its anti-bullying law as “[a] continuous pattern of 
intentional behavior that takes place on school property, on a school bus, or at a 
school-sponsored function.”140 Further, Oregon defines “bullying” as a certain act 
that “[t]akes place on or immediately adjacent to school grounds, at any school-




                                                
137 See e.g., Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive 
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 430 (2011) (“When student speech occurs outside of school 
supervision, the speech should receive the same First Amendment protection as a non-
student’s speech. Speech outside school supervision does not implicate the ‘essential 
characteristics’ of the school environment that justify special First Amendment treatment of 
student speech.”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. 
L. REV. 1027, 1102 (2008) (“The application of Tinker’s materially disruptive standard—
regardless of whether it is preceded with an inquiry into whether the speech is properly 
labeled ‘on-campus’ or ‘off-campus’ speech—provides little protection to students’ 
expressive rights. First, many courts are far too deferential to schools’ assertions that the 
challenged expressive activity was substantially and materially disruptive to schoolwork or 
discipline. Second, and more importantly, the Tinker test is ill-suited to speech in the digital 
media. Many off-campus events and activities can distract students from their work, but it 
would make no sense to permit schools to serve as a cultural censor.”).  
138 See infra Part III.B-E for cases that hold that schools, in certain situations, have 
authority to regulate online speech that originates off campus. But see Emmett v. Kent Sch. 
Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (“Plaintiff’s [mock website 
obituaries created off campus] was not at a school assembly, as in Fraser, and was not in a 
school-sponsored newspaper, as in Kuhlmeier. It was not produced in connection with any 
class or school project. Although the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to 
Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely outside of the school’s supervision or 
control.”). 
139 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (West 2016); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-140 (2014). 
140 ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2016). 
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stop.”141 Finally, South Carolina requires “each local school district shall adopt a 
policy prohibiting harassment, intimidation, or bullying at school.”142 The statute 
provides the following definition: 
 
“School” means in a classroom, on school premises, on a school bus or 
other school-related vehicle, at an official school bus stop, at a school-
sponsored activity or event whether or not it is held on school premises, or 
at another program or function where the school is responsible for the 
child.143 
 
In sum, under the laws of such states as Alabama, Oregon, and South Carolina, 
schools do not have the authority to regulate student speech that occurs off campus 
at nonschool-sponsored activities.144 Even if the speech substantially disrupts school 
activities, schools are powerless to regulate it under their states’ anti-bullying 
statutes. Most states’ anti-bullying laws follow this “no authority” approach and 
limit school jurisdiction to regulate bullying only if it occurs on-campus or at school-
sponsored events.145 
 
B.  The No Distinction Approach 
 
The second approach, which I call the “no distinction approach,” assumes that 
Tinker equally applies to both on-campus and off-campus speech. Courts that apply 
this approach go directly to the “substantial disruption” analysis regardless of where 
the speech originated.146 State legislatures that adopt this approach assume that 
schools have jurisdiction over online speech that is created off campus.147    
For example, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District,148 a middle school 
student in Pennsylvania created a fake profile on MySpace—a social networking 
site—that made fun of her principal.149 When she created the profile, it was neither 
during school hours nor on school grounds.150 The profile was presented as a self-
portrayal of an unnamed bisexual middle school principal, but displayed the 
                                                
141 OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (West 2016). 
142 S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-140 (2016). 
143 Id. at § 59-63-120. 
144 See ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (West 2016); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 59-63-140 (2016). 
145 STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 1 (noting that 36 out of 50 states 
do not include off-campus behaviors in their definitions of bullying).   
146 See e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
147 See e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 
(West 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11 (West 2016). 
148 650 F.3d at 920. 
149 Id. 
150 Id.  
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photograph of the student’s principal that the student obtained through the School 
District’s website.151 It contained “crude content and vulgar language, ranging from 
nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at 
the principal and his family.”152 The student was suspended and her parents brought 
a legal challenge to this discipline on First Amendment grounds.153 The Third Circuit 
“assume[d], without deciding,” that Tinker applied to the student’s off-campus 
speech.154 It then turned to the “substantial disruption” test, and held that the profile 
neither caused a substantial disruption nor created a reasonable forecast of a 
substantial disruption.155 The court noted that “the profile, though indisputably 
vulgar, was so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could take its 
content seriously, and the record clearly demonstrates that no one did.”156 
Some states’ anti-bullying laws have adopted a “no distinction” approach in 
dealing with off-campus student expression created online.157 These laws explicitly 
include off-campus acts in their definitions of “bullying.” For example, California 
defines “bullying” as certain types of “physical or verbal act or conduct, including 
communications made in writing or by means of an electronic act.”158 It further 
defines “[e]lectronic act” as “the creation or transmission originated on or off the 
schoolsite, by means of an electronic device.”159 Similarly, Florida prohibits 
“bullying or harassment” in a number of ways, including “[t]hrough the use of data 
or computer software that is accessed at a nonschool-related location, activity, 
function, or program or through the use of technology or an electronic device that is 
not owned, leased, or used by a school district or school.”160 Finally, Vermont 
provides, that “bullying” can include an act that “does not occur during the school 
day on school property, on a school bus, or at a school-sponsored activity and can 
be shown to pose a clear and substantial interference with another student’s right to 
access educational programs.”161 
In short, states such as California, Florida, and Vermont make no distinction 
between on-campus and off-campus speech for purposes of regulating 
                                                
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 926. 
155 Id. at 928. 
156 Id. at 929. 
157 See e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 
(West 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11 (West 2016). 
158 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016). 
159 Id. 
160 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016). 
161 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11 (West 2016). 
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cyberbullying.162 Many states that allow for school regulation of off-campus speech 
do it in ways similar to these states.163  
 
C.  The Nexus Approach 
 
The third approach, which I call the “nexus approach,” treats online expression 
as on-campus speech when it is made off campus, but either aimed at a specific 
school or subsequently brought to or accessed on campus.   
For example, in J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,164 a middle 
school student in Pennsylvania created a personal website, titled “Teacher Sux,” on 
a home computer that contained threatening and derogatory comments about his 
algebra teacher and the school’s principal.165 On one of the web pages, the student 
listed reasons why the teacher must die and asked for twenty dollars to help pay for 
the hitman.166 Another page contained a drawing of the teacher’s severed head.167 
J.S. told other students about this website and accessed it at school to show another 
student.168 The school subsequently expelled the student.169 The student’s parents 
challenged their son’s expulsion on First Amendment grounds.170 The first issue for 
the court was whether this website that was created from home was on-campus or 
off-campus speech.171 If it was on-campus speech, Tinker would apply, but if it was 
off-campus, only general First Amendment law would apply. The court found “a 
sufficient nexus between the website and the school campus to consider the speech 
as occurring on-campus.”172 It held, “[W]here speech that is aimed at a specific 
school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school 
by its originator, the speech will be considered on-campus speech.”173 The court then 
                                                
162 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 
2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11 (West 2016). 
163 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2016) (authorizing schools to 
“prohibit bullying . . . outside of the school setting . . .”); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-
23.7 (West 2016) (defining one form of bullying as “through the transmission of information 
from a computer that is accessed at a non-school-related location, activity, function, or 
program or from the use of technology or an electronic device that is not owned, leased, or 
used by a school district”); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2016) (stating 
that “a school entity shall not be prohibited from defining bullying in such a way as to 
encompass acts that occur outside a school setting”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-15 (2016) 
(defining one form of bullying “as any threatening use of data or computer software”). 
164 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 849 (2002).  
165 Id. at 851. 
166 Id.   
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 852.  
169 Id. at 852–53.  
170 Id. at 853. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 865. 
173 Id.  
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applied Tinker, and found that the school made an adequate showing that the website 
caused actual substantial disruption of the work of the school.174 It noted that the 
most significant disruption was the emotional and physical injuries suffered by the 
algebra teacher that forced her to take a medical leave of absence.175 It further noted 
the disruption to the students’ educational environment and parents’ weakened sense 
of school safety.176 Other courts have expanded the nexus and applied the Tinker 
analysis where off-campus speech makes its way to campus, even if by some other 
student.177 
Few state legislatures have incorporated a nexus approach, but New Jersey’s 
anti-bullying statute has come close.178 It provides that schools should have 
jurisdiction over “harassment, intimidation, or bullying . . . that occurs off school 
grounds, in cases in which a school employee is made aware of such actions.”179 
Illinois is another example.180 The Illinois law provides that the use of electronic 
devices for bullying shall be prohibited “only in cases in which a school 
administrator or teacher receives a report that bullying through this means has 
occurred.”181 Both New Jersey’s and Illinois’s laws are looser than a nexus approach 
because the expression does not have to be aimed at or actually reach campus. A 
school employee’s knowledge of the content would satisfy both states’ 
requirements.182    
 
D.  The Foreseeability Approach 
 
The fourth approach, which I call the “foreseeability approach,” makes Tinker 
applicable to instances in which social media expression is made off campus, but 
only when it is reasonably foreseeable that the expression would reach campus.   
                                                
174 Id. at 868–69. The court also found, under general First Amendment law that the 
website did not rise to the level of “true threat.” Id. at 859–60. 
175 Id. at 869. 
176 Id.  
177 See, e.g., Killion v. Franklin Regional Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. 
Pa. 2001) (“[B]ecause the [off-campus e-mail] list was brought on campus, albeit by an 
unknown person, Tinker applies.”); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 
1175, 1178–79 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying the Tinker analysis to student’s personal webpage 
when other students accessed it at school).  
178 N.J. STAT. ANN § 18A:37-15.3 (2016).   
179 Id. 
180 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7(a)(4) (2016). 
181 Id. 
182 At the time of the writing of this article, administrators at a New Jersey high school 
were investigating a bullying complaint under the State’s anti-bullying law after a student’s 
Twitter posts came to the attention of school officials. See Liam Stack, Tweets About Israel 
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For example, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Cent. School 
Dist.,183 a middle school student in upstate New York sent instant messages (“IMs”) 
from his home computer to 15 members of his “buddy list.”184 The student’s IM icon 
showed a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which 
were red dots representing blood, and beneath which were the words, “Kill Mr. 
VanderMolen,” who was the student’s English teacher.185 The icon was not sent to 
the teacher or any school official, but was viewable for three weeks by the student’s 
“buddies,” some of which were fellow students at the school.186 The school 
subsequently suspended the student for a semester and the student’s parents 
challenged the discipline in court as a violation of their son’s First Amendment 
rights.187 In determining that the speech at issue was on-campus speech, the Second 
Circuit held that Tinker applies to digital communications as long as there is a 
“reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of school 
authorities.”188 Due to “[t]he potentially threatening content of the icon and the 
extensive distribution of it,” the court concluded that the risk of the speech coming 
to the attention of school authorities was “at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, 
if not inevitable.”189 The court further held that once the icon was made known to 
school officials, it would “foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within 
the school environment.”190 
The Second Circuit again adopted this foreseeability approach in Doninger v. 
Niehoff.191 In Doninger, a high school student in Connecticut was upset with school 
officials’ decision to postpone a battle-of-the-bands concert that she helped 
organize, so she blogged about it on her personal website during nonschool hours.192 
On this publicly accessible site, she called school officials “douchebags,” 
mischaracterized the school’s decision to change the date as a cancellation, and 
                                                
183 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008).   
184 Id. at 36. The student “was using AOL Instant Messaging (‘IM’) software on his 
parents’ home computer. Instant messaging enables a person using a computer with Internet 
access to exchange messages in real time with members of a group (usually called ‘buddies’ 
in IM lingo) who have the same IM software on their computers. Instant messaging permits 
rapid exchanges of text between any two members of a ‘buddy list’ who happen to be on-
line at the same time. . . .The AOL IM program, like many others, permits the sender of IM 
messages to display on the computer screen an icon, created by the sender, which serves as 
an identifier of the sender, in addition to the sender’s name. The IM icon of the sender and 
that of the person replying remain on the screen during the exchange of text messages 
between the two ‘buddies,’ and each can copy the icon of the other and transmit it to any 
other ‘buddy’ during an IM exchange.” Id. at 35–36. 
185 Id. at 36. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 37. 
188 Id. at 38. 
189 Id. at 39–40. 
190 Id. at 40.  
191 527 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2008). 
192 Id. at 44–45. 
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encouraged students and parents to voice their complaints to the school.193 Students 
and parents subsequently called and emailed the school to protest the cancellation.194 
After learning about the blog post, the school’s principal concluded that the student’s 
conduct “had failed to display the civility and good citizenship expected of class 
officers.”195 On this basis, the school prohibited the student from running for senior 
class secretary.196 This student’s parents challenged this discipline as a violation of 
their daughter’s First Amendment rights.197 Citing to Wisniewski, the Second Circuit 
held, “We have determined . . . that a student may be disciplined for expressive 
conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when this conduct ‘would 
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at 
least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also 
reach campus.”198 In applying this rule, even though the blog post was created off 
campus, the court held that “it was reasonably foreseeable that [the student’s] 
posting would reach school property.”199 Indeed, the court noted, it was “purposely 
designed” to do so.200 In applying the Tinker test, the court also found that the 
student’s “post created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and 
discipline of the school.”201 Thus, the school’s disqualification of the student for 
running for student office was upheld.202  
The Eighth Circuit also follows the foreseeability approach. In D.J.M. v. 
Hannibal Public School District #60,203 a high school student in Missouri sent 
instant messages from his home computer to a classmate in which he talked about 
obtaining a handgun and shooting some other students at the school.204 A criminal 
investigation resulted from these messages, and the student was placed in juvenile 
detention.205 The school subsequently suspended the student for the rest of the school 
year because the messages had a disruptive impact on the school.206 The student’s 
parents challenged the suspension on constitutional grounds.207 The Eighth Circuit 
held that the student’s speech was not protected speech under Tinker’s substantial 
                                                
193 Id. at 45. 
194 Id.  
195 Id. at 46. 
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 47. 
198 Id. at 48 (citation omitted) (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d 
Cir.2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008)). 
199 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.  
200 Id.  
201 Id. at 53. 
202 Id.  
203 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). 
204 Id. at 757–58.  
205 Id. at 759. 
206 Id.  
207 Id. at 757. 
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disruption analysis.208 In applying Tinker to this online speech that was created from 
home, the court cited to Wisniewski, holding that it was “reasonably foreseeable that 
the instant messaging icon would come to the attention of the school authorities and 
the teacher,” and that it would also “create a risk of substantial disruption within the 
school environment.”209 
Similarly, in S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District,210 two Missouri high 
school students, who were twin brothers, created a personal website that contained 
a blog.211 The blog posts “contained a variety of offensive and racist comments as 
well as sexually explicit and degrading comments about particular female 
classmates, whom they identified by name. The racist posts discussed fights at [the 
school] and mocked black students.”212 The school district suspended the students 
for 180 days, but allowed them to enroll in another school for the duration of their 
suspensions.213 The students’ parents challenged the suspensions in court on First 
Amendment grounds.214 The Eight Circuit found that Tinker applied to the students’ 
off-campus blog posts because the posts were “targeted at” the school and, therefore, 
“could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the environment.”215 It 
then found that the blog posts easily met Tinker’s “substantial disruption” 
standard.216 
Some overlap may exist between the “nexus” approach and the “foreseeability” 
approach. For example, it could easily be foreseeable that certain off-campus speech 
aimed at a specific school will reach that school. However, the overlap is only 
partial. In some situations, where off-campus speech is not aimed at a particular 
school, it may nonetheless be foreseeable that such speech would reach the campus. 
For example, a student can create social media content not aimed at a particular 
school, but be on a platform where the student has many connections. In such a 
situation, it may well be reasonably foreseeable that this content could spread to a 
large number of people and reach the school anyway. Although this would also 
satisfy the “nexus” approach by creating a link through on-campus access, the 
process of arriving at the outcome would be different. Therefore, the “nexus” and 
“foreseeability” approaches can provide distinct methods of determining whether or 
not Tinker applies to cyberbullying that originates off campus. Like the “nexus” 
approach, the “foreseeability” approach has not yet been incorporated into many 
states’ anti-bullying laws. New York’s anti-bullying statute is an exception. It allows  
 
                                                
208 Id. at 764–66. 
209 Id. at 766 (citation omitted). 
210 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012). 
211 Id. at 773.   
212 Id.  
213 Id. at 774. 
214 Id. at 774–75. 
215 Id. at 778 (quoting Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 
2011)). 
216 Id. 
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schools to have jurisdiction over off-campus speech “where it is foreseeable that the 
conduct, threats, intimidation or abuse might reach school property.”217 
 
E.  The Identifiable Threat Approach 
 
The final approach, which I call the “identifiable threat” approach, allows 
schools to regulate off-campus speech if they are faced with an identifiable threat of 
school violence.   
For example, in Wynar v. Douglas County. School District,218 a high school 
student in Nevada sent violent messages to some of his friends from school in which 
he threatened to commit a mass shooting on a specific date.219 He wrote these 
messages from his home using MySpace.220 The student’s friends became 
increasingly concerned and reported these message to a football coach, who together 
with the students, met with the school principal.221 The student was subsequently 
suspended for ten days and, after a formal hearing, was expelled for 90 days.222 The 
student’s father challenged the expulsion on First Amendment grounds.223 The Ninth 
Circuit discussed the nexus and foreseeability approaches to determine how they 
would apply to these facts.224 The court observed:  
 
Given the subject and addressees of [the student’s] messages, it is hard to 
imagine how their nexus to the school could have been more direct; for the 
same reasons, it should have been reasonably foreseeable to [the student] 
that his messages would reach campus. Indeed, the alarming nature of the 
messages prompted [the student’s] friends to do exactly what we would 
hope any responsible student would do: report to school authorities.225  
 
But instead of adopting either approach, the Ninth Circuit articulated a new rule that 
“when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take 
disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets the requirements of 
Tinker.”226 In finding that the substantial disruption test had been met, the court held 
that “the school district officials reasonably could have predicted that they would 
have to spend ‘considerable time dealing with [parents’ and students’] concerns and 
                                                
217 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2016). 
218 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).   
219 Id. at 1065–66.   
220 Id. at 1065 (describing MySpace as “a social networking website that allows its 
members to set up online ‘profiles’ and communicate via email, instant messages, and 
blogs”) (quoting Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2011)).   
221 Id. at 1066. 
222 Id.  
223 Id.  
224 Id. at 1069. 
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
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ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in place.’”227 It also applied Tinker’s 
“interference with the rights of others” test, finding that since the messages 
“represent the quintessential harm to the rights of other students to be secure” since 
they “threatened the student body as a whole and targeted specific students by 
name.”228  
States with anti-bullying laws that have allowed for school regulation of off-
campus speech have not relied on this approach, mostly opting for the “no 
distinction” approach.    
Before turning to which approaches states and their public schools should adopt 
to reach off-campus cyberbullying, Part IV explores why schools should have 
authority to regulate such speech in the first place.   
 
IV.  WHY SCHOOLS SHOULD REGULATE CYBERBULLYING 
 
Some courts have expressed serious concerns about regulating their students’ 
off-campus speech.229 For example, in a case involving the off-campus creation of a 
fake profile of a school principal, one judge noted, “It would be an unseemly and 
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach 
into a child’s home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can 
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”230 As a 
general matter, this is true. However, there are three reasons that actual cases of 
cyberbullying require a different analysis: (1) the nature of the harm is unique; (2) 
other legal remedies are inadequate to protect victims; and (3) schools are in the best 
position to protect their students. 
 
A.  Cyberbullying Is Particularly Harmful 
 
Cyberbullying has some distinctive features from offline bullying that makes it 
much more harmful. First, since cyberbullying occurs through electronic devices, 
cyberbullies can reach their young victims at any time, whether or not they are in 
the same physical space.231 This feature makes any rigid distinction between on-
campus and off-campus speech almost inapplicable to cyberbullying. Cyberbullies 
can access their targets at any time and place. Due to the ubiquity of computers, 
smart phones, and social media, there is no safe haven for cyberbullying victims.232   
                                                
227 Id. at 1071 (alteration in the original) (quoting D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. 
No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir.2011)).  
228 Id. at 1072. Even though it applied this test, the court noted, “[f]ew circuit cases 
address the ‘invasion of the rights of others’ prong of Tinker.” Id. at 1071. 
229 See e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219–21 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Jordan, J., concurring). 
230 Id. 
231 Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Bullies Move Beyond the Schoolyard: A 
Preliminary Look at Cyberbullying, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 148, 148–50 (2006). 
232 See supra notes 97–121 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the unprecedented speed in which cyberbullying content reaches 
people allows for the harm to quickly reach the public without any time for the 
sender to reflect on whether the content should be modified or not sent at all.233 This 
speed is made possible by social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, and 
electronic communication, such as email and texts. At the click of a button, harmful 
content can be quickly posted online for people to see or sent directly to intended 
recipients.   
Third, in cyberbullying, harmful messages can reach a large audience.234 The 
viewers can easily share this content with others, and the material can quickly go 
“viral”—i.e., spread to a large number of users.235 The distribution of harmful 
content can also be orchestrated through social media. Certain platforms, such as 
Twitter, enable cyberbullies to engage in organized campaigns against a particular 
person, which involve many other people—a phenomena that has been referred to 
as “cyber-mobbing.”236  
Fourth, bullying through social media can be viewed repeatedly. In contrast to 
words uttered a single time in a physical encounter, cyberbullying’s words and 
images have the potential to be viewed over and over again. Each time the victim is 
confronted with the content, the victim is reinflicted with the harm.   
Fifth, since many people who know the victim also know the cyberbully 
through school, the cyberbully’s audience is likely to have overlapping social media 
connections with the victim’s social network.237 This interconnectedness increases 
                                                
233 John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 321, 
322–23 (2004) (“In e-mail and message boards, communication is asynchronous. People 
don’t interact with each other in real time. Others may take minutes, hours, days, or even 
months to reply. Not having to cope with someone’s immediate reaction disinhibits 
people.”). 
234 See supra, notes 97–121 and accompanying text.   
235 See e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[The 
student] afforded access to the profile to other students in the School District by listing them 
as ‘friends’ on the MySpace website, thus allowing them to view the profile. Not 
surprisingly, word of the profile ‘spread like wildfire’ and soon reached most, if not all, of 
Hickory High’s student body.”). 
236 See DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 61–62 (2014); see also 
Officials: Suicidal Teen Was Cyber-Bullied, CBSNEWS (Jan. 27 2010, 9:24 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/officials-suicidal-teen-was-cyber-bullied/ 
[https://perma.cc/4K9N-E5LB]; cf. Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/WQ87-VWEL] (“A Facebook page had sprung up about the man’s son, 
who was new in town. The comments included ethnic slurs, snickers about his sexuality and 
an excruciating nickname. In short order, nearly 50 children piled on, many of them readily 
identifiable.”). 
237 Some cyberbullies follow their victims online and integrate their victim’s new social 
media connections into their own to continue their attacks. For example, 12-year-old 
Amanda Todd killed herself after she continued to be cyberbullied even after she changed 
schools. Her mother explained: 
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the potential for humiliation because the harmful content will not just be consumed 
by strangers; people who know the victim will view it as well.  
Sixth, the content of social media is mostly unsupervised. Users of these 
platforms feel emboldened because there is no one directing them on how to behave 
online.238 Sherry Turkle writes, “These days, on social networks, we see fights that 
escalate for no apparent reason except that there is no physical presence to exert a 
modulating force.”239 
Seventh, social media can provide a cloak of anonymity and comfort of 
physical distance that encourages some young people to say things they would not 
normally say when they are face-to-face with a victim.240 Moreover, when a social 
media user does not have to respond to the real-time reactions of his or her audience 
members, it is much easier to act out with more frequency or intensity.241 John Suler 
has used the term “online disinhibition effect” to describe this phenomenon.242   
Eighth, the content of cyberbullying can be enduring. Even if the content is 
taken down from a website or social media platform, it may still survive through 
individual viewers saving the content electronically or printing out physical copies. 
Further, viewers can also use websites such as WayBack Machine243 that allow users 
to access old versions of websites, even if they have been taken down.  
  
                                                
 
Every time she moved schools [the cyberbully] would go undercover and 
become a Facebook friend. What the guy did was he went online to the kids who 
went to (the new school) and said that he was going to be a new student — that 
he was starting school the following week and that he wanted some friends and 
could they friend him on Facebook. He eventually gathered people’s names and 
sent Amanda’s [topless] video to her new school.  
 
Gillian Shaw, Amanda Todd’s Mother Speaks Out About Her Daughter, Bullying, 
VANCOUVER SUN (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.vancouversun.com/technology/Amanda+ 
Todd+speaks+about+daughter+death/7384521/story.html [https://perma.cc/2KLT-GRWS]. 
238 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 236 (quoting an eighth grade student as saying “[i]t’s 
easier to fight online, because you feel more brave and in control” . . . “[o]n Facebook, you 
can be as mean as you want”). 
239 TURKLE, supra note 97, at 235–36. 
240 See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, Who Spewed that Abuse? Anonymous Yik Yak App Isn’t 
Telling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/technology/ 
popular-yik-yak-app-confers-anonymity-and-delivers-abuse.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZFE5-2KSY] (detailing how the social media platform Yik Yak, which can be used 
anonymously, has spread from colleges to high schools and how students can abuse such a 
medium hidden by a veil of anonymity). 
241 Suler, supra note 233, at 321. 
242 Id. John Suler states six explanations for the online disinhibition effect: dissociative 
anonymity, invisibility, asynchronicity, solipsistic introjection, dissociative imagination, and 
minimization of authority. Id. at 322–324. 
243 WAYBACK MACHINE, http://archive.org/web/ [https://perma.cc/NLS3-BTGB]. 
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Based on these special characteristics, cyberbullying is particularly harmful. 
Social science research has shown that cyberbullying has significant impact on 
adolescents’ depression, anxiety, self-esteem, emotional distress, substance use, and 
suicidal behavior.244 Some studies show that young cyberbullying victims are about 
twice as likely to attempt suicide compared to those who have never experienced 
cyberbullying.245 
In comparing offline bullying with cyberbullying, Patricia S. Strom and Robert 
D. Strom argue, “Harmful [electronic] messages intended to undermine the 
reputation of a victim can be far more damaging than face-to-face altercations.”246 
Indeed, some studies show that students who report being cyberbullied are more 
fearful of harm and avoid school more than those students who report being verbally 
or physically bullied while at school.247 Data from the 2013 Crime Supplement of 
the national Crime Victimization Survey show that students who report being 
cyberbullied anywhere are more likely than those students who report being bullied 
at school to fear attack or harm.248 They are also more likely to skip school, skip 
class, avoid school activities, and avoid a specific place at school.249 Finally, they 
are more likely than those reporting being bullied offline to carry a weapon to 
school.250   
Due to the unique and serious harm of online bullying, cyberbullying should be 
given less protection than other forms of off-campus student speech. This approach 
is not without precedent.251 The Supreme Court has acknowledged, “There are 
                                                
244 See Charisse L. Nixon, Current Perspectives: The Impact of Cyberbullying on 
Adolescent Health, 5 ADOLESCENT HEALTH, MED. & THERAPEUTICS 143, 154 (2014).   
245 See, e.g., SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH 
CENTER, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY: CYBERBULLYING AND SUICIDE 1–2 
(2010), http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_and_suicide_research_fact_sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SQ2K-S48H] [hereinafter CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY]. 
246 Strom & Strom, supra note 102, at 36.  
247 See, e.g, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT REPORTS OF BULLYING AND CYBER-
BULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2013 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY T-39 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015056.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FX66-5AG9].  
248 Id. The report defines “bullying” as including “students being made fun of, called 
names, or insulted; being the subject of rumors; being threatened with harm; being pushed, 
shoved, tripped, or spit on; being pressured into doing things they did not want to do; being 
excluded from activities on purpose; and having property destroyed on purpose.” Id. at T-3. 
“Cyber-bullying” is defined to include “having another student post hurtful information 
about the respondent on the Internet; make unwanted contact by threatening or insulting the 
respondent via email, instant messaging, text messaging, or online gaming; purposefully 
exclude the respondent from an online community; or purposely share private information 
about the respondent on the Internet or mobile phones.” Id. at T-21. 
249 Id. at T-39. 
250 Id. The only outcome that is higher for students reporting to be bullied at school than 
students reporting to be cyberbullied anywhere is “engaged in a physical fight.” Id.  
251 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); see also 
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certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.”252 For example, the Court has not protected or given less protection to 
“fighting words,” certain types of defamation, incitement to imminent lawless 
action, “true threats,” and obscenity.253 Similarly, for the reasons given here, 
cyberbullying is so harmful that it should not be given full free speech protection. 
To clarify, I am not arguing for cyberbullying regulation to incorporate other 
categories of constitutionally unprotected or less protected speech in order to be held 
permissible.254 Instead, I am arguing that cyberbullying is so harmful in and of itself 
that it should be considered a separate category of speech that is not fully protected 
by the First Amendment. This lesser protection entails giving public schools the 
authority to regulate cyberbullying when it originates off campus.255   
 
B.  Other Legal Remedies Are Inadequate 
 
Courts have held that internet service providers and online interactive service 
companies are not responsible for the harmful content posted by their users.256 
Therefore, liability falls with the individual creators of the cyberbullying content. A 
number of legal remedies can be pursued against cyberbullies. For example, many 
states provide civil causes of action such as defamation; however, some legal 
scholars contend that these remedies are lacking in cases of cyberbullying, mostly 
because the traditional elements of these remedies fail to acknowledge the unique 
nature of the digital world.257 In addition, many states also provide criminal law 
                                                
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1952). 
252 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.   
253 See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.   
254 But see Brady, supra note 123, at 41 (arguing that legislatures should define 
“cyberbullying” in a way “that is both narrowly and specifically crafted to meet one of the 
current ‘unprotected’ classes of free speech and expression, including defamation, fighting 
words, obscenity, speech that incites others to lawless action, and true threats”) (citations 
omitted). 
255 See infra Part IV.C where I argue that the regulations should primarily take the form 
of restorative practices. 
256 See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) “creates a federal immunity to any cause 
of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-
party user of the service.”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that, under the CDA, Matchmaker.com cannot be liable for the actions of its 
users). 
257 See Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish 
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 276–80 (2008) (analyzing the 
insufficiency of civil remedies such as defamation to redress cyberbullying). But see 
Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1100 (“Restricting the authority of schools to punish online 
speech does not mean that the student speech goes unpunished; instead, students still would 
face possible criminal prosecution and civil liability.”); Goldman, supra note 137, at 409 
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protections, such as traditional stalking laws and new cyberstalking and 
cyberbullying statutes.258 Some scholars have also taken issue with these laws, 
mostly on First Amendment grounds.259 Thus, an adequate remedy in the courts is 
uncertain, time-consuming, and expensive.260 In sum, due to the murkiness of the 
legal issues involved and the high costs of litigation, these remedies seem out of 
reach for most victims. On the other hand, for the reasons addressed in the next 
section, schools themselves are in a better position to deal with cyberbullying than 
the courts.   
 
C.  Schools Are Uniquely Situated to Regulate Cyberbullying 
 
Schools should be given broad discretion to regulate cyberbullying for a 
number of reasons. First, schools are in the best position to mediate these situations. 
To be clear, I am not arguing for a return to some golden age of in loco parentis261 
à la Justice Clarence Thomas in Morse.262 I have a more modest argument. I simply 
                                                
(“[A]doption of the Tinker test for speech outside of school supervision is not necessary to 
protect against the most troubling problems created by student speech. Speech that a 
reasonable person would interpret as a threat to student or teacher safety may be disciplined 
under the ‘true threat’ doctrine.”). 
258 See Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 140–47 (2007) 
(analyzing how different state statutes deal with cyberstalking).    
259 See id. at 135–39 (critiquing stalking and cyberstalking laws, many of which require 
a “credible threat” of violence, as insufficient to address the unique problem of online 
stalking); see also John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyberbullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free 
Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 121 (2011) (arguing that the majority of criminal anti–
cyberbullying laws are a legal threat to student free speech because they ban student speech 
based solely on content or viewpoint); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Andrea Garcia, How Not 
to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693 (2012) (analyzing the First Amendment 
infirmities of current cyberbullying criminal statutes and suggesting improved ways 
forward). 
260 See CITRON, supra note 236, at 122 (“Victims bear the costs of bringing tort . . . 
claims, and those costs can be heavy. . . . Even if victims can afford to sue their attackers, 
they may be reluctant to do so if their attackers have few assets.”); Erb, supra note 257, at 
279 (“Since civil laws that are not likely to punish speech between adults would also not 
likely punish derogatory speech posted on students’ web sites about other students, what are 
parents supposed to do to protect their children from the emotional wreckage that such 
comments can cause in the life of an adolescent? Civil lawsuits are expensive, and parents 
have had little success using the Communications Decency Act in convincing Internet 
service providers to shut down cyberbullying web sites.”). 
261 See supra note 43. 
262 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (“In light of the history of 
American public education, it cannot seriously be suggested that the First Amendment 
‘freedom of speech’ encompasses a student’s right to speak in public schools. Early public 
schools gave total control to teachers, who expected obedience and respect from students.”) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
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contend that schools are in a better position to identify and remediate incidents of 
cyberbullying than courts. If cyberbullying is criminalized in a state,263 then courts 
would have a role in its regulation. However, most states put the main onus on 
schools to come up with and implement anti-bullying policies, which include 
disciplinary procedures and centralized reporting requirements.264 This legislative 
choice to delegate enforcement to schools is motivated by the fact that, unlike courts, 
schools know who their students are, have contact with students’ parents, and 
therefore have a basis for understanding the social contexts in which they are 
operating. These community connections are manifested in parent-teacher meetings, 
Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs),265 parent volunteer opportunities, and other 
forms of shared educational process between teachers, staff, students, and parents.266 
Given this knowledge of the community and individuals within it, schools should be 
given the discretion to deal with those who use social media to repeatedly attack 
weaker students. They are in the best position to do so.  
Further, public schools should regulate cyberbullying because one of the main 
purposes of these institutions is to teach students how to respectfully interact with 
each other in order to preserve democratic ideals.267 The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that schools exist to “prepare pupils for citizenship in the 
Republic . . . [and] inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in 
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government in the community and the nation.”268 In short, the Court has emphasized 
that the purpose and function of schools is not just academic training, but also the 
“inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system.”269  
                                                
263 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7 (2016) (defining “cyberbullying” as a crime 
consisting of “the transmission of any electronic textual, visual, written, or oral 
communication with the malicious and willful intent to coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate 
a person under the age of eighteen”). 
264 STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS, supra note 124, at 1. 
265 For a history of Parent Teacher Associations in America, see generally WILLIAM W. 
CUTLER, III, PARENTS AND SCHOOLS: THE 150-YEAR STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION 4 (2000). 
266 See generally Diana B. Hiatt, Parent Involvement in American Public Schools: A 
Historical Perspective 1642––1994, 4 SCH. COMMUNITY J. 27, 27–28 (1994) (tracing the 
devolvement of control over public education from parents to the state); Gwendolyn L. 
Watson et al., Understanding Parental Involvement in American Public Education, 2 INT’L 
J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 41 (2012) (reviewing the literature on parental involvement in schools 
in the United States). 
267 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).  
268 Id.  
269 Id. See also Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, 
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory 
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is 
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Also, schools should be given the authority to regulate cyberbullying because 
they are shifting toward meaningful solutions to heal the community, and not just 
excluding the wrongdoer from the learning environment.270 For example, the 
Minnesota Department of Education encourages restorative justice practices in its 
schools when bullying occurs.271 The Minnesota Department of Education’s website 
explains, “Restorative Measures is a discipline intervention to hold students 
accountable for harm, and address the needs of students or staff harmed as well as 
the school community.”272 A study conducted by the Minnesota Department of 
Education found that principals relied heavily on restorative justice to address 
bullying behavior in their schools.273 One principal observed: 
 
We had repeated bullying incidents on the playground perpetrated by a 
small group of kids. Each class of fifth graders came to the gym where the 
phy(sical) ed(ucation) teacher and I conducted a circle with the classroom 
teacher. As each student used the talking piece, they were able to explain 
to the kids who were causing the problems how they felt about what they 
                                                
the very foundation of good citizenship.”); cf. DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE 
GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010) (“The central purpose of education [is] to shape 
good human beings, good citizens, people of good character with the knowledge and skills 
to make their way in the world and to join with others to sustain and improve our 
democracy.”).   
270 This is a promising approach that stands in stark contrast to the focus on harsh 
punitive outcomes under the increasingly defunct “zero tolerance” policies. See W. DAVID 
STEVENS, ET AL., UCHICAGO CONSORTIUM ON SCHOOL RESEARCH, DISCIPLINE PRACTICES 
IN CHICAGO SCHOOLS: TRENDS IN THE USE OF SUSPENSIONS AND ARREST 6, 29 (2015), 
http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/publications/discipline-practices-chicago-schools-trends-use-
suspensions-and-arrests [https://perma.cc/9GSG-WFKL] (analyzing how Chicago public 
schools are moving away from “zero tolerance” by doing a better job at resolving disciplinary 
problems without excluding children from school); Carly Berwick, Zeroing Out Zero 
Tolerance, THE ATLANTIC (March 17, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/ 
2015/03/zeroing-out-zero-tolerance/388003/ [https://perma.cc/YL5X-6ULN] (discussing “a 
shift away from zero-tolerance school discipline toward less punitive strategies that 
emphasize talking it out and resolving disputes among students to keep them in school”). 
271 Restorative Practices, MINN. DEP’T EDUC., http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/ 
safe/clim/prac/ [https://perma.cc/K6UA-7LKN]. For more detailed explanations of 
restorative practices in schools, see JEANNETTE HOLTHAM, TAKING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
TO SCHOOLS: A DOORWAY TO DISCIPLINE 1–3 (2009); MARGARET THORSBORNE, 
IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE PRACTICE IN SCHOOLS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
TRANSFORMING SCHOOL COMMUNITIES 11–17 (2013); HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK 
OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 42–59 (2002). 
272 Toolkit, MINN. DEP’T EDUC., http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/fsce/mod/div/ 
Tool/ [https://perma.cc/83UQ-6EYY].  
273 MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTORATIVE MEASURES IN SCHOOLS SURVEY, 2011 1 
(2012), http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/safe/clim/prac/index.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
L3J5-7ECE]. The study consisted of a 21-question survey, with 417 elementary, middle 
school, and high school principals returning the survey. Id. at 2.  
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were doing. We also discussed what the expectations are for student[-]to[-
]student and student[-]to[-]adult interactions—respect, appropriate, 
responsible, etc. 
The severe behavior has stopped, I think because students were 
empowered to let the kids who were bullying know how they felt about 
it—it was out in the open—a great place to be. Victims also realized they 
were not alone—so isolation was no longer an issue either. Parents 
responded very well to this intervention—and suspension was not used as 
a result.274 
 
Other states have applied restorative practices in culturally specific ways. For 
example, the Hawaii Department of Education has opted to encourage school 
communities to “Grow Pono” in order “to create a more welcoming and safe 
environment for everyone at their school.”275 E Ola Pono is a Hawaiian term that 
means “to live with respect for and in harmony with everyone and everything around 
you.”276 The Hawaii Department of Education’s website explains why it adopted this 
approach: “Student[-]led projects and campaigns have proven to be the most 
effective and powerful initiatives to reduce harassment and bullying in schools. 
Addressing this need in a culturally relevant way based on Hawaii’s host culture 
provides a foundation that can benefit all people who call Hawaii home.”277 
In the aftermath of bullying or cyberbullying, the Hawaii Department of 
Education urges schools to find ways for the injured community to heal.278 The 
website explains, “Community-wide strategies can help identify and support 
children who are bullied, redirect the behavior of children who bully, and change 
the attitudes of adults and youth who tolerate bullying behaviors in peer groups, 
schools, families and communities.”279 This is one state’s culturally-specific 
application of restorative justice principles. It addresses a serious problem with 
solutions that are relevant to the people who live there. Some scholars argue that 
restorative justice is so much more effective than suspension and expulsion that it 
should be incorporated into anti-bullying legislation.280 For now, schools have the 
                                                
274 Id. at 2.  







280 See, e.g., Leah M. Christensen, Sticks, Stones, and Schoolyard Bullies: Restorative 
Justice, Mediation, and a New Approach to Conflict Resolution in Our Schools, 9 NEV. L. J. 
545, 574–78 (2009) (arguing for the incorporation of restorative practices in schools’ 
implementation of anti-bullying policies); Susan Duncan, Restorative Justice and Bullying: 
A Missing Solution in the Anti-Bullying Laws, 37 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
267, 269 (2011) (arguing “that restorative justice practices offer a better long-term solution 
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discretion to implement such principles in an attempt to address bullying and 
cyberbullying in a holistic way.281   
Moreover, schools should be the primary institutions that deal with 
cyberbullying because school-age children often make bad choices that can 
influence their futures and because part of the schooling process at this age is to 
learn from these mistakes without being permanently penalized.282 Thus, reasonable 
school discipline with a focus on restorative justice would be a much better outcome 
in these situations than a juvenile criminal record or protracted civil litigation 
followed by a potential settlement or civil damages award paid by a student’s family.   
Finally, schools should have the power to regulate cyberbullying because 
potential liability arises from civil rights laws and tort law when schools fail to 
protect their students.283 Without the power to regulate, schools are put in an 
impossible position, a position where they are exposed to liability for failure to 
protect their students, notwithstanding the lack of discretion to adequately provide 
that protection.   
                                                
than criminal charges or civil actions for effectively addressing bullying”).  
281 See, e.g., Patricia Leigh Brown, Opening Up, Students Transform a Vicious Cycle, 
N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/education/restorative-
justice-programs-take-root-in-schools.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/D8QF-A79X] (noting 
the effectiveness of restorative justice practices adopted by some New York City public 
schools); Eric Westervelt, An Alternative to Suspension and Expulsion: “Circle Up!”, NPR 
(Dec. 17, 2014, 3:42 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2014/12/17/347383068/an-
alternative-to-suspension-and-expulsion-circle-up [https://perma.cc/WRM4-C3NB] (“[T]he 
Oakland Unified School District [is] at the forefront of a new approach to school misconduct 
and discipline. Instead of suspending or expelling students who get into fights or act out, 
restorative justice seeks to resolve conflicts and build school community through talking and 
group dialogue.”). 
282 A serious consequence of excessive school punishment is students being funneled 
into the school-to-prison pipeline. See generally DISRUPTING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON 
PIPELINE 1–4 (Sofía Bahena et al. eds., 2012) (describing how the pipeline works and how to 
disrupt it); CATHERINE L. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING 
LEGAL REFORM 1–8 (2012) (same). 
283 See, e.g., Sheli Muniz, Mother of Cyberbullying Victim to File Wrongful Death 
Lawsuit, CLICKORLANDO.COM (Nov. 25, 2013, 6:24 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/ 
news/mother-of-cyberbullying-victim-to-hold-news-conference/23143300 [https://perma.cc 
/B8PW-V6T9] (reporting that the mother of Rebecca Sedwick “plans to file a wrongful death 
lawsuit against those responsible for her daughter’s death.”); Carri Greer Thevenot, Parents 
Sue School District Over Bullied Daughter’s Suicide, L.V. REV.-J. (Oct. 21, 2014, 5:21 PM), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/parents-sue-school-district-over-bullied-
daughter-s-suicide [https://perma.cc/M7XB-GMCE] (reporting that parents of 13-year-old 
Hailee Lamberth, who killed herself after being bullied, are suing her middle school for 
wrongful death); see also Failure to Prevent Bullying Can Prove Costly to School Districts, 
LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (May 8, 2013, 4:09 PM), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/b/jverdicts/archive/2013/06/28/failur
e-to-prevent-bullying-can-prove-costly-to-school-districts.aspx [https://perma.cc/RX5N-
ELFP] (detailing settlements and jury awards in school bullying cases across the country). 
868 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
For these reasons, schools should be given broad authority to regulate 
cyberbullying, even when it originates off school grounds and is not part of any 
school-sanctioned activities. However, this authority should not be limitless. Part V 
outlines how schools can exercise this authority to protect their students in a way 
that effectively balances students’ free speech concerns.   
 
V.  THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR SCHOOL REGULATION OF CYBERBULLYING 
 
When states create anti-bullying laws, they need to do so in a way that 
effectively balances the safety of their students with their students’ free speech 
rights. This tension can be seen in a recent case that was decided by the Court of 
Appeals of New York.   
In People v. Marquan,284 a sixteen-year-old high school student in Albany, New 
York anonymously posted, on a publicly-accessible Facebook page, descriptions of 
his classmates’ alleged sexual practices and preferences, sexual partners, and other 
types of personal information.285 He was criminally prosecuted for cyberbullying 
under a local law, and he brought a First Amendment challenge to the statute 
claiming that the law was overbroad286 and vague.287 In 2010, the Albany County 
Legislature adopted a new crime for “cyberbullying,” which it defined as “any act 
of communicating or causing a communication to be sent by mechanical or 
electronic means, including . . . disseminating embarrassing or sexually explicit 
photographs . . . or sending hate mail . . . with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten, 
abuse, taunt, intimidate, torment, humiliate, or otherwise inflict significant 
emotional harm on another person.”288 
While acknowledging that the law “was motivated by the laudable public 
purpose of shielding children form cyberbullying,” the court nonetheless struck it 
down as unconstitutionally overbroad.289 It noted that “the law covers 
communications aimed at adults, and fictitious or corporate entities, even though the 
county legislature justified passage of the provision based on the detrimental effects 
that cyberbullying has on school-aged children.”290 In sum, the court held that the 
text of Albany County’s law was overbroad because it covered much more speech 
                                                
284 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014). 
285 Id. at 484.  
286 Id. at 485 (“A regulation of speech is overbroad if constitutionally-protected 
expression may be ‘chilled’ by the provision because it facially ‘prohibits a real and 
substantial amount of’ expression guarded by the First Amendment.”) (citations omitted) 
(quoting People v. Barton, 8 N.Y.3d 70, 75 (N.Y. 2006)). 
287 Id. at 486 (“[A] statute is seen by the courts as vague if it fails to give a citizen 
adequate notice of the nature of proscribed conduct, and permits arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.”) (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d 529, 538 (N.Y. 
1995)). 
288 Id. at 489 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
289 Id. at 488.  
290 Id. at 486. 
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than was needed to regulate cyberbullying.291 The court also noted that the County 
conceded that certain terms in the statute such as “embarrassing” and “hate mail” 
were vague.292 In other words, the statute failed to give a citizen adequate notice of 
what was prohibited by the law. Therefore, based on both overbreadth and vagueness 
grounds, the law was struck down as facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment.293 
The constitutional issues in Marquan are relevant to the issues involved when 
schools seek to regulate cyberbullying. Specifically, state lawmakers and school 
officials must pay special attention to overbreadth and vagueness concerns when 
regulating cyberbullying—particularly in (1) defining the concept; (2) defining the 
school’s reach in regulating off-campus speech; and (3) applying Tinker to 
cyberbullying. I will address how they should avoid some constitutional pitfalls in 
the following sections.   
 
A.  Defining Cyberbullying 
 
Most states treat cyberbullying as a subset of bullying—that is, cyberbullying 
is typically defined as bullying through electronic communication or devices.294 The 
definition of “bullying” has had three major components in social science literature: 
(1) intent to harm; (2) repetition; and (3) an imbalance in power between the bully 
and the victim.295 Some states, like Virginia, incorporate all of these elements into 
their definition.296 But most states adopt only some of these elements into their anti-
                                                
291 Id. (“[T]he provision pertains to electronic communications that are meant to 
‘harass, annoy . . . taunt . . . [or] humiliate’ any person or entity, not just those that are 
intended to ‘threaten, abuse . . . intimidate, torment . . . or otherwise inflict significant 
emotional harm on’ a child. In considering the facial implications, it appears that the 
provision would criminalize a broad spectrum of speech outside the popular understanding 
of cyberbullying, including, for example: an email disclosing private information about a 
corporation or a telephone conversation meant to annoy an adult.”) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Local Law No. 11 [2010] of County of Albany § 2). 
292 Id. at 489 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
293 Id. at 488. 
294 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r)(1) (West 2015) (prohibiting bullying by 
“means of an electronic act”); FL. STAT. § 1006.147(2)(d) (West 2015) (prohibiting bullying 
“through the use of technology or an electronic device”); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01(A) 
(West 2015) (“‘Bullying’ includes cyber bullying.”). 
295 See Nansel et al., supra note 7, at 2094. 
296 Virginia’s anti-bullying law provides:  
 
“Bullying” means any aggressive and unwanted behavior that is intended to harm, 
intimidate, or humiliate the victim; involves a real or perceived power imbalance 
between the aggressor or aggressors and victim; and is repeated over time or 
causes severe emotional trauma. “Bullying” includes cyber bullying. “Bullying” 
does not include ordinary teasing, horseplay, argument, or peer conflict. 
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bullying laws.297 However, to avoid unconstitutional overbreadth and vagueness 
issues specifically in relation to regulating cyberbullying, I contend that the first two 
elements, along with an expanded version of the third element, should be applied to 
cyberbullying.   
First, states should include an intent requirement for cyberbullying. Some 
states, like Louisiana298 do, while others like California,299 do not incorporate an 
intent requirement. A recent Supreme Court case that dealt with the level of proof 
that is sufficient for a conviction for threatening another person through social media 
is instructive insofar as it provides guidance in thinking about the proper level of 
intent for criminalizing online speech. In Elonis v. U.S.,300 Anthony Elonis was 
convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).301 This federal statute provides, 
“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication 
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of 
another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both.”302 Elonis was prosecuted for posting violent rap lyrics on Facebook about his 
estranged wife.303 He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 44 months in 
prison.304 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) 
required proof of subjective intent to threaten, or whether it was enough to show a 
negligence standard—that is, show that a “reasonable person” would regard the 
statement as threatening.305 The Court held that the trial court’s instruction that 
required only negligence with respect to the communication of a threat was not 
sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).306 Although the Court 
                                                
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016). 
297 Note that some states include an intent requirement, but the intent is not linked to 
the harm; instead, it is linked to the behavior itself—that is, a person must have had the intent 
to send the communication. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (2016) (defining “harassment” 
as “[a] continuous pattern of intentional behavior that takes place on school property, on a 
school bus, or at a school-sponsored function”); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.1-A (2016) (“For 
purposes of this article, ‘bullying’ shall mean an intentional electronic, written, verbal or 
physical act, or a series of acts . . . .”). I argue that the intent requirement should be linked to 
the harm, and not just the act of communicating. Compare LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7 (2016) 
(intent required), and VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016) (intent required), with CAL. 
EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (intent not required).  
298 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7 (2016) (“Cyberbullying is the transmission of any 
electronic textual, visual, written, or oral communication with the malicious and willful 
intent to coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate a person under the age of eighteen.”). 
299 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (“‘Bullying’ means any severe or 
pervasive physical or verbal act or conduct . . . .”).   
300 Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015).   
301 Id. at 2007.  
302 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) (2012). 
303 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005. 
304 Id. at 2007. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. at 2012. 
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did not specify what level of proof would be sufficient—for example, recklessness 
or intentional conduct—it clarified that negligence was not enough to support 
Elonis’s criminal conviction.307 
In states that have criminalized cyberbullying, this case suggests that 
negligence is not a sufficient standard. Instead, the proof should be higher. To be 
consistent with Elonis, the crime of cyberbullying should include a standard higher 
than negligence. As one example, Maryland makes cyberbullying a criminal 
misdemeanor, which includes “intent to harass, alarm or annoy” as an element.308 
Maryland’s law is consistent with the holding of Elonis in that it requires a higher 
standard than negligence in criminalizing online speech.309   
Definitions of cyberbullying for school-regulation purposes should also include 
an intent requirement—namely, to serve as an important limitation on schools from 
regulating too much speech. For example, in Virginia, bullying, which includes 
cyberbullying, means “any aggressive and unwanted behavior that is intended to 












                                                
307 Id. 
308 The elements of the crime of cyberbullying in Maryland are: 
 
(1)   A person may not maliciously engage in a course of conduct, through the use 
of electronic communication, that alarms or seriously annoys another: 
(i)   with the intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other; 
(ii)   after receiving a reasonable warning or request to stop by or on behalf of the 
other; and 
(iii)   without a legal purpose. 
(2)   A person may not use an interactive computer service to maliciously engage 
in a course of conduct that inflicts serious emotional distress on a minor or places 
a minor in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury with the intent: 
(i)   to kill, injure, harass, or cause serious emotional distress to the minor; 
or 
(ii)   to place the minor in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. 
 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805 (West 2016). 
309 See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012. 
310 VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016). 
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sense because it separates speech that is intended to harm from speech that is not 
intended to harm311 This distinction allows Virginia to only regulate speech that is 
intended to harm. 
Second, the repetition element should be a required component of 
cyberbullying. Like the intent element, some states require repetition in their 
definitions of “bullying” and “cyberbullying,” while other states do not.312 For 
example, Massachusetts defines “bullying” as “the repeated use . . . of a written, 
verbal or electronic expression.”313 Similarly, “bullying” in Florida “means 
systematically and chronically inflicting physical hurt or psychological distress on 
one or more students.”314 Furthermore, South Dakota provides that “[b]ullying is a 
pattern of repeated conduct.”315 On the other hand, in states like Oregon316 and 
California,317 a single act, if severe enough, can constitute bullying and 
cyberbullying. However, if a law does not include a repetition element, then it is not 
distinguishing cyberbullying with single-incident “cyberattacking.”318 This 
distinction is important because it has constitutional implications insofar as 
broadening a school’s jurisdiction over cyberattacking and would allow schools to 
regulate too much speech. Ari Ezra Waldman explains that cyberbullying should 
receive different legal treatment from cyberattacking because cyberattacking is 
                                                
311 Hinduja and Patchin cite an example of an unintentional act that is outside the scope 
of cyberbullying: 
 
[F]riends of a teen girl set up an online profile on Instagram where people are 
asked to comment or vote for the prettiest girl among four shown.  The idea is to 
show their friend that she is very pretty.  The profile creators stuff the virtual ballot 
box so that their friend emerges victorious, not realizing that by doing so the other 
three girls involved in the vote have had their feelings hurt. 
 
HINDUJA & PATCHIN, supra note 9, at 15. 
312 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 370 (a) (West 2015) (“repeated”); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016) (“systematically and chronically”), and S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 13-32-15 (2016) (“pattern of repeated conduct”), with OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
339.351 (2) (West 2016) (including a single act), and CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49800 (West 2016) 
(including “an act”). 
313 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 370 (West 2016). 
314 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016). Florida’s statute gives the following 
examples of bullying: “1. Teasing; 2. Social exclusion; 3. Threat; 4. Intimidation; 5. Stalking; 
6. Physical violence; 7. Theft; 8. Sexual, religious, or racial harassment; 9. Public or private 
humiliation; or 10. Destruction of property.” Id. 
315 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-15 (2016). 
316 OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351 (2016) (defining “harassment, intimidation or bullying” 
as satisfied by “any act”). 
317 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (defining “bullying” as “one or more acts” 
that meet certain statutory requirements). 
318 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705, 
711–15 (2012) (differentiating cyberbullying from cyberattacking). 
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much more common—and much less harmful—than cyberbullying, and treating 
these two concepts the same would allow schools to have authority over too much 
speech.319 Therefore, a repetition element, in conjunction with an intent element, is 
important to address overbreadth and vagueness concerns.  
Third, although social scientists have incorporated a power imbalance between 
bully and victim as one of the defining elements of “bullying,” when applied to the 
concept of “cyberbullying,” this element should take into account the special context 
of online communication. For offline bullying, this power imbalance is usually 
based on physical size and strength. A bully is typically a bigger and stronger student 
who preys on physically weaker students.   
But state legislatures have recognized that the power imbalance can also be 
based on social status categories. For example, Maryland enumerates specific groups 
with lower levels of power in its definition of “bullying.”320 Maryland defines 
“bullying, harassment, or intimidation” as certain conduct that is “[m]otivated by an 
actual or a perceived personal characteristic including race, national origin, marital 
status, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, ancestry, physical attribute, 
socioeconomic status, familial status, or physical or mental ability or disability.”321 
California prohibits “bullying based on the actual or perceived characteristics . . . 
[of] disability, gender, gender identity, gender expression, nationality, race or 
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or association with a person or group with one 
or more of these actual or perceived characteristics.”322 New Hampshire’s law is 
more general in that it provides “‘[b]ullying’ shall include actions motivated by an 
imbalance of power based on a pupil’s actual or perceived personal characteristics, 
behaviors, or beliefs, or motivated by the pupil’s association with another person 
and based on the other person’s characteristics, behaviors, or beliefs.”323 However, 
                                                
319  
[C]yberbullying should receive different legal treatment [because] some 
single-incident cyberattacks are too common to merit a departure from free speech 
values. When assessing the frequency and effects of cyberbullying on their test 
subjects, social scientists distinguish between single incidents and repeated 
patterns. Their data show that supermajorities of certain student populations have 
experienced single-incident cyberattacking, but significantly fewer report the kind 
of negative effects that activists and legislators have said merit a strong state or 
legal response. This suggests that if single-incident cyberattacking were crowded 
under the cyberbullying umbrella, there would be little conduct left outside the 
reach of anti-cyberbullying regulations. 
 
Id. at 715 (citations omitted).  
320 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1 (West 2016). 
321 Id.  
322 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 234.1 (West 2016). 
323 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (2016). Note that some states eschew the creation 
of status-based categories based on the idea that they want to prevent certain classes of 
students from receiving “special treatment.” See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775(3) (West 
2016) (“Each district’s antibullying policy shall be founded on the assumption that all 
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due to the nature of online bullying, both physical size and strength differences and 
traditional status categories hold less sway.   
For online bullying, other types of factors can create power imbalances. For 
example, a cyberbully’s power can arise from certain possessions, attributes, and 
skills—such as possessing embarrassing information about another student, 
obtaining unauthorized access to another student’s Facebook or Twitter account, or 
having particular savvy with social media. A statute that narrows the categories of 
power imbalance to certain status categories excludes the most relevant 
characteristics that lead to the power imbalances in cases of cyberbullying.   
Few states have broad enough power imbalance language to sufficiently 
address the unique online context. Texas is one example of a state that does this, and 
defines certain conduct as “bullying” if it “exploits an imbalance of power between 
the student perpetrator and the student victim.”324 In applying this language, things 
like possessing embarrassing photos of a fellow student or hacking another student’s 
Facebook account, could meet this definition. In addition, with such an inclusive 
definition, other potentially relevant sources of power imbalance could also be 
factored in such as age, popularity, and social competence.  
Other states omit the power imbalance element from their bullying regulations 
altogether.325 However, I argue that states should include this element because it 
creates a distinction between cyberbullying and speech that does not rise to that 
level, such as peer-on-peer teasing or name-calling.326 When two students with 
similar levels of power (access to information, computer skills, etc.) attack each 
other online, this is not cyberbullying. This is what the Virginia anti-bullying law 
                                                
students need a safe learning environment. Policies shall treat students equally and shall not 
contain specific lists of protected classes of students who are to receive special treatment.”). 
324 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0832 (West 2016) (defining “bullying” as “written or 
verbal expression, expression through electronic means, or physical conduct that occurs on 
school property, at a school-sponsored or school-related activity, or in a vehicle operated by 
the district”). However, Texas’s anti-bullying law restricts school authority to on campus 
behaviors. See id. 
325 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 370 (West 2016). 
326 In a Title IX liability context, the Court has noted: 
 
Indeed, at least early on, students are still learning how to interact appropriately 
with their peers. It is thus understandable that, in the school setting, students often 
engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct 
that is upsetting to the students subjected to it. Damages are not available for 
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, however, even 
where these comments target differences in gender. Rather, in the context of 
student-on-student harassment, damages are available only where the behavior is 
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal 
access to education that Title IX is designed to protect. 
 
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651–52 (1999) (emphasis added).  
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refers to as “ordinary teasing, horseplay, argument, or peer conflict.”327 Further, 
according to my proposed definition, students who target and attack teachers or 
administrators online are not engaging in cyberbullying. When the attack is against 
authority figures, instead of cyberbullying, Renee Servance refers to this as “cyber-
harassment,” which she defines as “the targeting of adult members of the school 
community on the Internet.”328 Teachers and administrators, given their position of 
authority in relation to their students, will inherently have more power than their 
students. Even if there are status differences between students and teachers that favor 
the students,329 the fact that school employees can discipline students necessarily 
puts teachers in a position of greater power. Thus, when students attack teachers and 
administrators, it is cyberharassment, not cyberbullying. In my framework, 
cyberharassment occurs without regard to any power imbalances. Equally powerful 
peers can cyberharass each other, less powerful peers can cyberharass more 
powerful ones, and students can cyberharass teachers. While these behaviors can 
still be harmful, they do not arise to cyberbullying. 
Instead of combining the concepts of cyberattacking, cyberharassment, and 
cyberbullying, as many states do,330 these concepts should be treated as distinct. 
While cyberattacking and cyberharassment can cause harm, due to the higher degree 
of injury that cyberbullying presents,331 anti-bullying laws and policies should limit 
their scope to this specific form of intentional student-on-student repetitive 
aggression based on power imbalances when regulating off-campus speech.   
In an analysis of state anti-bullying laws, a report sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Education emphasized the distinction between harassment and 
bullying by noting, “Harassment . . . is generally viewed as a subset of more broadly 
defined bullying behavior. Harassment also violates federal civil rights laws as a 
                                                
327 See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016). 
328 Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between 
Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (2003).   
329 For example, a male student and a female teacher or a white student and an African 
American teacher.   
330 
 
Many bullying laws enacted since 1999 were originally modeled on existing civil 
rights legislation that protects groups from various forms of harassment under the 
law. The legislative language used in crafting bullying laws often borrows directly 
from harassment statutes. This has frequently led to a conflation of terms used to 
define prohibited conduct, with ‘bullying’ and ‘harassment’ often used 
interchangeably in laws, despite their important legal distinctions. 
 
VICTORIA STUART-CASSEL ET AL., DEPT. OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE BULLYING LAWS 
AND POLICIES 17 (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-
laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6LM-PTRQ].    
331 See supra, Part IV.A. Schools should also have authority to regulate on campus 
cyberattacking and cyberharassment. However, a normative analysis of such regulation is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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form of unlawful discrimination.”332 Therefore, a clear separation of cyberbullying 
and cyberharassment can provide better guidance on how schools can comply with 
the separate requirements of federal civil rights laws333 and Tinker. Of particular 
note, different rules apply to a school’s off-campus liability under the civil rights 
statutes than would apply under Tinker. For example, Title IX would allow for 
damages in cases of sexual harassment that occurs off campus if a school had 
substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known sexual 
harassment occurred—a standard that would not likely be met in most cases of 
cyberbullying that take place off campus.334 On the other hand, both courts and state 
legislatures are divided as to whether schools have any jurisdiction—and legal 
responsibility—over cyberbullying that originates off campus—applying the “no 
authority,” “no distinction,” “nexus,” “foreseeability,” or “identifiable threat” 
approaches.   
The distinction between harassment and bullying is also important because 
some state antiharassment statutes have already been analyzed by courts, and they 
have been found unconstitutional.335 For example, the Third Circuit in Saxe v. State 
College Area School District336 struck down a public school district’s antiharassment 
policy as unconstitutionally overbroad.337 Justice Alito, then a circuit judge writing 
for the majority, noted, “There is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First 
Amendment’s free speech clause.”338 Even though some courts refuse to recognize 
less constitutional protection for harassment,339 cyberbullying should be treated 
differently. If defined as a form of speech not fully protected by the First 
Amendment due to the special harm associated with it, schools would be enabled to 
protect their most vulnerable students from intended and repeated attacks that 
originate off campus while balancing the free speech rights of their students.   
In summary, schools should have the authority to regulate cyberbullying that 
originates off campus, but not other categories of off-campus online speech unless 
it falls under another exception to the First Amendment.340    
After states and schools define what “bullying” means, state laws and school 
policies should be clear about what is meant by “cyberbullying,” including 
nonexclusive examples of what constitutes “bullying.” For example, Massachusetts 
law after defining “bullying,”341 explicitly defines “cyber-bullying” as: 
 
[B]ullying through the use of technology or any electronic 
communication, which shall include, but shall not be limited to, any 
                                                
332 STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 330, at 17 (citation omitted). 
333 See supra notes 14–16. 
334 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999). 
335 See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2001). 
336 Id.  
337 Id. at 217. 
338 Id. at 204. 
339 See id. 
340 See supra note 13–18 and accompanying text. 
341 See supra note 313. 
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transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of 
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system, including, but 
not limited to, electronic mail, internet communications, instant messages 
or facsimile communications. Cyber-bullying shall also include (i) the 
creation of a web page or blog in which the creator assumes the identity of 
another person or (ii) the knowing impersonation of another person as the 
author of posted content or messages, if the creation or impersonation 
creates any of the conditions enumerated in clauses (i) to (v), inclusive, of 
the definition of bullying. Cyber-bullying shall also include the 
distribution by electronic means of a communication to more than one 
person or the posting of material on an electronic medium that may be 
accessed by one or more persons, if the distribution or posting creates any 
of the conditions enumerated in clauses (i) to (v), inclusive, of the 
definition of bullying.342 
 
Massachusetts’s law is effective in that it includes a definition of “cyberbullying” 
with specific examples of what types of activities that can comprise it, without 
limiting the definition to only those examples.343 This language can guide schools in 
creating their anti-bullying policies.344 
  
                                                
342 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016) (emphasis added). 
343 See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016) (“‘Cyberbullying’ means 
bullying through the use of technology or any electronic communication, which includes, 
but is not limited to, any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic 
system, photoelectronic system, or photooptical system, including, but not limited to, 
electronic mail, Internet communications, instant messages, or facsimile communications. 
Cyberbullying includes the creation of a webpage or weblog in which the creator assumes 
the identity of another person, or the knowing impersonation of another person as the author 
of posted content or messages, if the creation or impersonation creates any of the conditions 
enumerated in the definition of bullying. Cyberbullying also includes the distribution by 
electronic means of a communication to more than one person or the posting of material on 
an electronic medium that may be accessed by one or more persons, if the distribution or 
posting creates any of the conditions enumerated in the definition of bullying.”) (emphasis 
added). Other states’ laws are less clear. Indiana law, for example, prohibits “cyberbullying,” 
but does not define this term. See IND. CODE §§ 20-30-5.5-3, 20-33-9-0.2 (2016). Maryland 
law does not mention “cyberbullying,” but prohibits “bullying, harassment, or intimidation” 
by “intentional electronic communication.” MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §7-424.1 (West 2016). 
344 The Massachusetts statute mandates schools, both public and private, to “develop, 
adhere to and update a plan to address bullying prevention and intervention . . . .” MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016). 
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Furthermore, anti-bullying policies should focus on regulating children’s 
speech in order to protect other children.345 Not all do.346 This distinction also has 
constitutional significance. The Supreme Court has yet to define the contours of 
school authority for off-campus cyberbullying. However, the Court has 
acknowledged that children generally have less free speech protection than adults.347 
For example, the Court in Fraser noted that “the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings. . . . ‘[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right 
to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.’”348 The Court also recognized 
an “obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco 
parentis, to protect children.”349 In light of the special relationship between First 
Amendment protections and children, schools should be given broad authority to 
regulate cyberbullying when perpetuated by their students against other students, 
even when it occurs off campus. The “nexus” and “foreseeability” approaches 
framed as threshold inquiries provide limits on school authorities from regulating 
too much speech.     
 
B.  Defining the School’s Reach in Regulating Cyberbullying 
 
State laws and school policies should also contain the parameters of when 
schools can regulate off-campus speech. The opposite sides of the spectrum are the 
“no distinction” and “no authority” approaches. As we have seen, some states’ anti-
                                                
345 See, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.1-A (2016) (“bullying” means an act “directed 
at another student or students”). 
346 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-256 (2016) (defining bullying as “[a]ny intentional 
gesture or any intentional written, verbal, electronic or physical act or threat either by any 
student, staff member or parent towards a student or by any student, staff member or parent 
towards a staff member”).   
347 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 215 (2003) (“The 
interest in protecting young library users from material inappropriate for minors is legitimate, 
and even compelling . . . .”) (Kennedy, J., concurring); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 
726, 749–50 (1978) (upholding regulation protecting children from broadcast indecency); 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (“[T]he State has an interest to ‘protect the 
welfare of children’ and to see that they are ‘safeguarded from abuses . . . .’”) (quoting Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)). 
348 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (quoting Thomas v. 
Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F. 2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Neuman, J., 
concurring). “Cohen’s jacket” is a reference to a Supreme Court case in which the Court 
overturned a man’s conviction for the crime of disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket that 
displayed the phrase “Fuck the Draft” at a courthouse. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 
(1971).   
349 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) 
(“Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to 
educate their students.”) (Powell, J., concurring).   
2016] EXPANDING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 879 
bullying statutes provide very broad authority for schools.350 Massachusetts law, for 
example, prohibits bullying that originates off campus “if the bullying creates a 
hostile environment at school for the victim, infringes on the rights of the victim at 
school or materially and substantially disrupts the education process or the orderly 
operation of a school.”351 This statute takes the “no distinction” approach and treats 
off-campus activity the same as on-campus activity, as long as Tinker is satisfied or 
the federal civil rights law standard of “hostile educational environment” is met.352   
In contrast to Massachusetts, Texas defines “bullying” as certain expression or 
conduct “that occurs on school property, at a school-sponsored or school-related 
activity, or in a vehicle operated by the district.”353 Unlike the Massachusetts law, 
this statute only restricts speech that occurs on-campus or at school-sanctioned 
activities (e.g., at a field trip or riding on a school bus).354 The legislature adheres to 
the “no authority” approach and assumes that schools do not have jurisdiction to 
regulate off-campus or nonschool-related speech. The problem with Texas’s law is 
that schools are deemed powerless to act in the face of cyberbullying that is created 
on social media platforms off campus.355 One judge highlighted the problem with 
the following hypothetical situation: 
 
With the tools of modern technology, a student could, with malice 
aforethought, engineer egregiously disruptive events and, if the trouble-
maker were savvy enough to tweet the organizing communications from 
his or her cellphone while standing one foot outside school property, the 
school administrators might succeed in heading off the actual disruption 
in the building but would be left powerless to discipline the student.356 
 
Although courts have generally not applied the “no authority” approach to the Tinker 
test,357 a number of courts have applied it to Fraser’s “lewd and vulgar speech” 
analysis.358 Three cases are illustrative.   
  
                                                
350 See supra Part III.B. 
351 MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 71, § 370 (2016). 
352 Id. 
353 TEX. EDUC. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0832 (West 2016). 
354 Id. 
355 See Julieta Chiquillo, Bullying Proves a Vexing Problem for Texas Schools, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS (April 26, 2015, 10:40 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/metro/20 
150426-bullying-proves-a-vexing-problem-for-schools.ece [https://perma.cc/QZ78-LM9E] 
(noting the problems with Texas’s anti-bullying law because it “doesn’t address expressions 
made off campus—such as videos or social media posts—that seep into school life.”). 
356 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., 
concurring). 
357 See supra Part III.B–E for cases that hold that schools, in certain situations, have 
authority to regulate online speech that originates off campus.   
358 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 
2011); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 212 n.12, 216–17 nn.16–17.  
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First, in Layshock v. Hermitage School District, a high school student in 
Pennsylvania created a “parody profile” of his principal on MySpace.359 The profile 
consisted of the principal’s official picture copied from the School District’s website 
and a number of bogus answers to profile survey questions that were based on a 
theme of “big,” because the principal is a large man.360 The student made the profile 
at his grandmother’s house, while he was on her computer during nonschool 
hours.361 The student gave access to the profile to other students in the school district 
by listing them as “friends” on MySpace.362 The profile soon “spread like wildfire” 
and “reached most, if not all, of [the school’s] student body.”363 The school 
subsequently suspended the student for ten days and imposed a number of other 
sanctions including banning the student from all extracurricular activities and 
prohibiting the student from participating in his graduation ceremony.364 The 
student’s parents filed suit in court to challenge this discipline on constitutional 
grounds.365   
The Third Circuit noted that the unchallenged holding of the district court was 
that the student’s speech was not likely to cause a substantial disruption under 
Tinker.366 It, therefore, focused its attention on whether or not this off-campus 
speech was covered by Fraser.367 The school made the following arguments: (1) a 
sufficient nexus exists between the vulgar profile and the school; (2) the speech 
initially began on campus because the student was enrolled in school and copied the 
principal’s photograph from a school website; and (3) it was reasonably foreseeable 
                                                
359 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08. 
360 Id. at 208.   
 
For example, Justin answered “tell me about yourself” questions as follows: 
Birthday: too drunk to remember 
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak 
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt 
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills 
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick 
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg 
Ever been drunk: big number of times  
Ever been called a Tease: big whore 
Ever been Beaten up: big fag 
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart 
Number of Drugs I have taken: big. 
 
Id. 
361 Id. at 207. 
362 Id. at 208. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. at 210. 
365 Id. 
366 Id. at 214. 
367 Id. at 216–217. 
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that the profile would come to the attention of the school.368 Rejecting all three 
arguments, the Third Circuit then held that under Fraser, the school did not have the 
authority to punish the student for this off-campus speech, even if it was lewd and 
vulgar.369   
Second, in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, even though the Third Circuit 
applied Tinker to a student’s off-campus creation of a fake profile of the school’s 
principal under the “no distinction” approach, it did not extend the same reach to 
Fraser.370 The court noted, “Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard cannot be extended to 
justify a school’s punishment of [a student] for use of profane language outside the 
school, during non-school hours.”371 The court cautioned, “Under this standard, two 
students can be punished for using a vulgar remark to speak about their teacher at a 
private party, if another student overhears the remark, reports it to the school 
authorities, and the school authorities find the remark ‘offensive.’”372 
Finally, in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the Court applied Tinker 
because it found a “sufficient nexus” between the “Teachers Sux” website and the 
school,373 and the Court refused to apply Fraser because “the circumstances before 
us are also not on all fours with Fraser.”374 The Court noted, “Certainly, the speech 
at bar could be considered lewd, vulgar and offensive. It was not, however, 
expressed at any official school event or even during a class, subjecting unsuspecting 
listeners to offensive language.”375 
In explaining the difference between Tinker and Fraser as applied to off-
campus speech, Mary-Rose Papandrea contends that courts are reluctant to apply 
Fraser because a school would only have to show, under Fraser, that the speech was 
lewd or offensive, and this would give schools too much regulatory authority.376 
However, Tinker’s analysis—i.e., proving a forecast of substantial disruption or 
interference with the rights of others—creates a significant check against the almost 
                                                
368 Id. at 214. 
369 Id. at 216. 
370 Id. at 932. 
371 Id. 
372 Id. at 933. 
373 Id. at 865.  
374 Id. at 866. 
375 Id. 
376 Papandrea, supra note 137, at 1070 (“[C]ourts are more reluctant to apply Fraser to 
off-campus speech than Tinker because at least Tinker requires a showing that the expression 
disrupted or could reasonably be expected to disrupt school activities; Fraser does not. In 
other words, courts must recognize that even if they conclude that the Tinker test applies to 
off-campus speech, that test still requires schools to meet the substantial disruption standard 
prong of Tinker. . . . Fraser, in contrast, does not require the school to make any showing 
that the offensive language disrupted the school’s activities; as a result, schools could restrict 
any indecent speech by a student, anywhere regardless of where he engages in it, without 
any additional showing. The idea that schools could regulate offensive speech on the Internet 
without showing any harm to the school would give school officials almost limitless 
authority to police their students’ expression.”) (citations omitted). 
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unlimited school authority that would be absent if Fraser applied to off-campus 
speech. In addition to this check, adding a “nexus” and/or “foreseeability” threshold 
requirement before applying the Tinker test would create another limitation on 
school power to regulate off-campus speech.377   
In a recent case, Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,378 the Fourth Circuit 
utilized the “nexus” and “foreseeability” approaches in a situation involving a 
student attacking another student online.379 In Kowalski, a high school student in 
West Virginia was suspended for creating a MySpace webpage from her home that 
ridiculed a fellow student.380 The webpage was called “S.A.S.H.,” which the student 
claimed stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes.”381 Another student testified 
during a deposition that the acronym really stood for “Students Against Shay’s 
Herpes,” referring to another student, Shay N.382 The webpage’s creator invited 
approximately 100 people on her Myspace “friends” list to join the discussion group 
and approximately two dozen students from her high school joined.383 The members 
of the discussion group posted comments, accusing Shay N. of having herpes and 
being a “whore.”384 Shay N.’s father learned about this website and met with school 
officials to file a complaint. School officials concluded that the student had created 
a “hate website, in violation of the school policy against harassment, bullying, and 
intimidation.”385   
West Virginia’s anti-bullying law, which was enacted in 2001 and in effect 
when the student created the website, required each county board to develop and 
implement an anti-bullying policy “prohibiting harassment, intimidation or bullying 
of any student on school property or at school sponsored events.”386 This state law 
adopted the “no authority approach.” That is, it viewed schools without authority to 
regulate off-campus speech. 
  
                                                
377 I do not advocate for the “identifiable threat” approach as a stand-alone option 
because I believe it would not allow schools to regulate most cases of cyberbullying, where 
verbal and psychological aggression are present, but do not rise to the level of identifiable 
threat of school violence. See Daniel Marcus-Toll, Note, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging 
Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3395, 3432 (2014). However, it could be added to the legal framework 
that I advocate for in this Article to ensure that such threats are clearly covered under a 
school’s regulatory authority.   
378 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
379 Id. at 573. 
380 Id. at 567. 
381 Id.  
382 Id. 
383 Id.  
384 Id. at 568. 
385 Id. at 568–69. 
386 W. VA. CODE §18-2C-3 (West 2010) (amended 2011).   
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The student who created the website was suspended for ten days, which was 
later reduced to five days.387 She was also given a ninety-day “social suspension,” 
which prevented her from attending some school events.388 Consistent with the 
legislature’s mandate,389 the high school adopted a “no authority” approach in its 
anti-bullying policy.390 Specifically, the Student Handbook prohibited “any form of 
. . . sexual . . . harassment . . . or any bullying or intimidation by any student . . . 
during any school-related activity or during any education-sponsored event, 
whether in a building or other property owned, use[d] or operated by the Berkeley 
Board of Education.”391  
Relying on the language contained in the school’s own policy, the student 
challenged her discipline on First Amendment grounds.392 She argued that the school 
had no authority to regulate her online speech that took place at her home after 
school hours.393 In upholding the school’s discipline, the court imposed an additional 
threshold requirement in both the “nexus” and “foreseeability” approaches in 
determining whether Tinker applied to this off-campus speech.394 The Fourth Circuit 
first applied the foreseeability analysis and observed that, although the student 
“pushed her computer’s keys in her home, . . . she knew that the electronic response 
would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home and could reasonably be 
expected to reach the school or impact the school environment.”395 The court held: 
“To be sure, it was foreseeable in this case that [the student’s] conduct would reach 
the school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices, given that most 
of the ‘S.A.S.H.’ group’s members and the target of the group’s harassment were 
[students at the same school].”396 
The court also applied the nexus approach, noting that it was “satisfied that the 
nexus of [the student’s] speech to [the high school’s] pedagogical interests was 
sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school officials in carrying out their 
role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.”397 The court analyzed the 
nexus as between the speech and the school’s interest in maintaining a safe learning 
environment. However, a physical connection between the speech and the campus 
itself was also present. First, the student directed her webpage to fellow students at 
her school.398 Additionally, students accessed it at the school,399 and the target’s 
                                                
387 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 569. 
388 Id. 
389 See supra Part III.A. 
390 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 569. 
391 Id. (emphasis added). 
392 See id. at 567. 
393 Id. at 573. 
394 See id.  
395 Id.  
396 Id. at 574. 
397 Id. at 573. 
398 Id. at 567. 
399 Id. at 574 (“[T]he ‘S.A.S.H.’ webpage did make its way into the school and was 
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father brought a printed copy of the webpage onto the school.400 The Fourth Circuit, 
after determining that Tinker applied, upheld the school’s discipline because the 
student’s expression “created ‘actual or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption 
in the school.”401   
It is important to note that even though the state legislature enacted a “no 
authority” approach and the school adopted the same for its student handbook, a 
court enabled this school greater leeway in regulating cyberbullying speech created 
off campus. Specifically, it imposed an additional threshold—consisting of the 
nexus and foreseeability approaches—before applying Tinker in order to uphold 
school discipline for off-campus speech.402 This highlights a promising direction that 
would allow schools to have an active role in regulating cyberbullying speech that 
is created off campus, while giving due consideration to students’ constitutional 
rights. Some states’ legislatures are moving in this direction.403 More should 
follow.404   
  
                                                
accessed first by [high school] student Ray Parsons at 3:40 p.m., from a school computer 
during an after hours class.”). 
400 Id. at 568. 
401 Id. at 574. 
402 Id. at 573. 
403 See supra text accompanying notes178–182 and 217 and accompanying text.  
404 Naomi Goodno proposes the following model language: 
 
The school shall have jurisdiction to prohibit cyberbullying that originates off 
the school’s campus if: 
(i) it was reasonably foreseeable that the electronic communication would 
reach the school’s campus; or 
(ii) there is a sufficient nexus between the electronic communication and the 
school which includes, but is not limited to, speech that is directed at a 
school-specific audience, or the speech was brought onto or accessed on the 
school campus, even if it was not the student in question who did so. 
 
Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A 
Model Cyberbullying Policy that Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth 
Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 697 (2011). 
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C.  Applying Tinker to Cyberbullying 
 
Once a court determines that Tinker applies because of a sufficient nexus to 
campus or a reasonable foreseeability of reaching campus, it should then apply at 
least one, and perhaps both, of the Tinker standards. Specifically, Tinker asks if the 
student speech: (1) “would substantially interfere with the work of the school” or (2) 
“impinge on the rights of other students.”405 If the answer to either question is in the 
affirmative, then a school can regulate the speech. 
Under the first test, I contend that the way some courts have defined 
“substantial disruption” creates too high a standard for cases of cyberbullying. For 
example, a federal trial court in Missouri found no substantial disruption in a case 
where students accessed a student’s webpage that used vulgar language to attack 
school officials in the school’s library and during a computer class, but there was no 
disturbance in either the library or the class.406 Additionally, a federal trial court in 
California, in a case involving a student who was punished for posting a video 
containing derogatory comments about a thirteen-year-old student to YouTube, 
overturned the student’s two-day suspension noting that “to allow the School to . . . 
suspend a student simply because another student takes offense to her speech, 
without any evidence that such speech caused a substantial disruption of the school’s 
activities, runs afoul of Tinker.”407 These lower courts view substantial disruption as 
something that must affect more than one student to be present. This high standard, 
however, would fail to protect a victim of cyberbullying. Todd Erb explains: 
 
Bullies naturally pick on weak individuals rather than large numbers of 
students. The effects of bullying may be excruciating to bear for that 
individual, but the rest of the student body may not even know about the 
bullying, much less feel its effects. Since bullying is often 
“individualized,” there is a diminished chance that cyberbullying incidents 
will cause a “substantial or material disruption” to the school environment. 
It may cause a “substantial or material disruption” to one student’s 
learning environment, but such a disruption would most likely fail the high 
standard . . . .408 
 
                                                
405 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). Other 
cases haves suggested an expansive interpretation of Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 
(2007). See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007); Nuxoll 
v. Indian Prairie School District, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). Such an interpretation could 
potentially create additional authority for public schools to regulate cyberbullying. However, 
this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.  
406 Beussink ex rel Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–
78 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
407 J.C. ex rel R.C. v. Beverley Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117 
(C.D. Cal. 2010). 
408 Erb, supra note 91, at 274. 
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In other words, in many cases of cyberbullying, a court looking for a student’s 
speech to cause substantial disruption to an entire school building, classroom, or 
general school environment would not likely find it.  
In contrast, I argue that substantial disruption should be defined in the context 
of cyberbullying as focusing on the disruption to the victim’s educational 
experience. This is the better approach, and it is not without precedent. In Kowalski 
v. Berkeley County Schools, for example, the court focused on the disruption to the 
cyberbullied victim’s educational experience in finding that substantial disruption 
occurred. It observed that she had to miss school in order to avoid further abuse and 
warned there might have been a “snowballing effect” of worsening harassment if the 
school had not intervened.409 In an analogous case, J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School 
District, upholding the school’s punishment of a student, the court described “the 
most significant disruption”410 as the harm that the student caused to an algebra 
teacher by creating a webpage about her.411 
Under the second test, which has not been heavily relied on by courts,412 a 
school would need to show that student speech interfered with the rights of others in 
order to regulate it.413 In one of the few cases that has applied this test, Harper v. 
Poway Unified School District,414 a high school prohibited a student from wearing a 
T-shirt that had the words “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT 
GOD HAS CONDEMNED” handwritten on the front, and “HOMOSEXUALITY 
IS SHAMEFUL” handwritten on the back.415 In upholding the school’s authority to 
do this, the court relied on Tinker’s second test.416 It held:  
 
We conclude that [the student’s] wearing of his T-shirt “colli[des] with the 
rights of other students” in the most fundamental way [citing Tinker, at 
508]. Public school students who may be injured by verbal assaults on the 
basis of a core identifying characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual 
orientation, have a right to be free from such attacks while on school 
campuses.417 
 
The Ninth Circuit then cited research that showed the psychological and educational 
harm that young gay and lesbian students experienced as a result of verbal and 
                                                
409 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011). 
410 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002). 
411 Id. In this case, a teacher was targeted, so I would argue that it is a case of 
cyberharassment and not cyberbullying.   
412 But see Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(applying the “interference with the rights of others” test).   
413 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).   
414 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 
415 Id. at 1170–71. 
416 Id. at 1178.   
417 Id.  
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physical abuse at school.418 The court concluded that “the School had a valid and 
lawful basis for restricting [the student’s] wearing of his T-shirt on the ground that 
his conduct was injurious to gay and lesbian students and interfered with their right 
to learn.”419 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Alex Kozinski warned that such a broad 
application of Tinker’s second test could eliminate free speech rights at schools.420 
He argued that opposing homosexuality is just one side of a controversial debate 
and, thus, should be protected.421 The majority, however, did not see it this way. 
Instead, it noted:  
 
Such disagreements may justify social or political debate, but they do not 
justify students in high schools or elementary schools assaulting their 
fellow students with demeaning statements: by calling gay students 
shameful, by labeling black students inferior or by wearing T-shirts saying 
that Jews are doomed to Hell.422 
 
The court further noted:  
 
To say that homosexuality is shameful is to say, necessarily, that gays and 
lesbians are shameful. There are numerous locations and opportunities 
available to those who wish to advance such an argument. It is not 
necessary to do so by directly condemning, to their faces, young students 
trying to obtain a fair and full education in our public schools.423 
 
This application of the “interference with the rights of others” test should be applied 
to cases of cyberbullying, as either an alternative to the “substantial disruption” test 
or in conjunction with it. Just as the gay and lesbian students were harmed by the 
message on the shirts, the victims of cyberbullying are harmed by the messages of 
their attackers. Schools should not be forced to sit idly by while their most powerless 
students are being injured. The court in Harper recognized, “Those who administer 
                                                
418 Id. at 1179 (“[I]t is well established that attacks on students on the basis of their 
sexual orientation are harmful not only to the students’ health and welfare, but also to their 
educational performance and their ultimate potential for success in life.”). 
419 Id. at 1180. 
420 Id. at 1198 (“The ‘rights of others’ language in Tinker can only refer to traditional 
rights, such as those against assault, defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion and 
blackmail, whose interplay with the First Amendment is well established. Surely, this 
language is not meant to give state legislatures the power to define the First Amendment 
rights of students out of existence by giving others the right not to hear that speech.”) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). See also Bonnie A. Kellman, Note, Tinkering with Tinker: 
Protecting the First Amendment in Public Schools, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 367, 373–84 
(2009) (criticizing the holding of Harper). 
421 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1196 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
422 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1181. 
423 Id. 
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our public educational institutions need not tolerate verbal assaults that may destroy 
the self-esteem of our most vulnerable teenagers and interfere with their educational 
development.”424 Cyberbullying victims are also vulnerable. By the definition of 
“cyberbullying” that I advocate for here, which includes a power imbalance element, 
this must be the case. Their educational rights should not be allowed to be interfered 
with by those with more power who intentionally try to harm them over and over 




Cyberbullying has received increasing societal attention in the aftermath of the 
tragic suicides of some of its youngest and most vulnerable victims.425 In this Article, 
I have argued that cyberbullying is so harmful, in and of itself, that it should be 
afforded diminished First Amendment protections. I have also advocated for a 
narrow definition of cyberbullying that incorporates the three elements of the 
prevailing social scientists’ definition of “bullying” as it relates to cyberbullying: (1) 
intent to harm; (2) repetition; and (3) power imbalance between cyberbully and 
victim.   
In addition, many cases of cyberbullying have involved harmful student 
expression created off campus—for example, a derogatory website or insulting 
Facebook posts made at home or threatening emails and texts sent from smartphones 
miles away from school. Most state laws do not allow their primary or secondary 
schools to regulate this type of expression because it did not occur at school or at a 
school-sanctioned event. These states adopt a “no authority” approach in regulating 
off-campus speech. However, this approach leaves schools powerless in the face of 
the serious harm created by cyberbullying that originates off campus. Some states 
adopt a “no distinction” approach, treating the regulation of on-campus and off-
campus speech the same as long as they meet the substantial disruption test of Tinker 
v. Des Moines.426 However, this approach does not adequately address students’ free 
speech rights because there is no check on the school’s power to regulate student 
speech when it occurs off campus. 
In order to provide schools with the authority to protect their students from 
cyberbullying and also to incorporate a check on such power, I have proposed an 
alternative to the “no authority” and “no distinction” approaches. Specifically, I have 
urged that schools adopt a “nexus” or “foreseeability” approach to regulate 
cyberbullying that originates off campus. The Fourth Circuit has applied these two 
approaches in analyzing the constitutionality of the disciplinary actions of school 
officials in situations where students used social media to attack or threaten other 
students.427 For this court, schools can regulate off-campus student speech if there is 
a nexus between the speech and the campus—for example, the creator of a website 
                                                
424 Id. at 1179. 
425 See CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 245, at 1–2. 
426 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).   
427 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
2016] EXPANDING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 889 
aims the site at a specific school by sending invites to the school’s students to view 
it or someone accesses the site on campus. In the alternative, schools have regulatory 
authority if it is reasonably foreseeable that the off-campus speech will reach 
campus. The “nexus” and “foreseeability” approaches effectively balance the 
competing interests of protecting cyberbullying victims and protecting students’ free 
speech rights.   
Finally, I have urged that the Tinker analysis be tailored to cases of 
cyberbullying insofar as the “substantial disruption” test is focused on the victim 
and not the total school environment, and, in the alternative or along with the 
“substantial disruption” test, the “interference with the rights of others” test be 
applied in these situations.   
In these ways, schools can effectively balance the protection of their most 
vulnerable students from a particular type of serious harm with their students’ free 
speech rights. 
